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Address
By ALEXANDER G. R UTHV E N

President of the University of Michigan

W

E HAVE met here today specifically to dedicate Hutchins
Hall, the last unit to be erected of a splendid group of
buildings presented to the University by Mr. W. W.

Cook. The buildings are beautiful, useful, and enduring, but taken alto
gether, with all that they are in themselves and all that they signify, they
represent only one part of a comprehensive contribution to the educa
tional resources of the University of Michigan. It is, therefore, both
fitting and imperative that we should on this occasion consider carefully
the significance of our whole heritage.
Other persons today will speak of Mr. Cook's generosity, of his
interest in education, of his loyalty to his University, of his public
spirit, and of his regard and respect for the law. Undoubtedly these
attributes were contributing factors in his decision to erect these build
ings and to provide an endowment for Legal Research. But, it is my
purpose to discuss the deeper significance of his splendid gift.
A benefaction to an educational institution is generally a joint one.
The gift often bears the name of the partner who provides the capital,
and the silent partners are those faculty members, past and present,
whose ability and faithfulness have developed the school, department, or
project to the point where it challenges the interest, and is worthy of the
support, of the donor. It is eminently fitting that the University should,
in part, recognize the faculty's contribution to the gift of Mr. Cook by
giving to the classroom building the name of that honored alumnus,
7
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professor, dean, and president, Harry B. Hutchins, who dreamed with
the benefactor the vision which has now materialized.
Benefactors and faculties alike understand that the recognition of such
a partnership in giving to education in no way lessens the gratitude due
to donors by a thoughtful public. On the whole, it should increase
respect for the giver since it connotes intelligence and thought, rather
than sentimentality or ignorance, in giving. We are correctly informed
that "He gives not best who gives most; but he gives most who gives
best. "
The responsibility of the silent partners, present and future, in an
enterprise of this kind is clear cut. Their duty is to carry on in the tradi
tions of their predecessors. They must spare no pains to justify the
investment by increasingly better results in teaching, research, and
service. In this way, and in this way only, can they perpetuate the gift
and properly immortalize the donor.
Mr. Cook did not care for notoriety; he was not moved to assist the
University solely by a sentimental attachment to the institution; and he
was not ambitious to establish a monument for himself. Clearly his was
a deep and intelligent appreciation of the aims of education and of the
results and needs of his school in its efforts to advance his beloved pro
fession. Above all, he had faith in the wisdom and integrity of the
Regents, in the ability and ideals of the faculty, and in the sincerity of
the students of the University of Michigan. Knowing his principal part
ners in this enterprise, -the Law School faculty and the University
staff, -without fear and without reservation I, as the official represent
ative of the University, pledge to Mr. Cook's memory wholehearted
support of his noble ambitions and fidelity to the trust which he has
imposed upon his Alma Mater.

The Law School
Accepts the Responsibility
By H E N RY M. B ATES

Tappan Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School1 University of Michigan

N

INE years ago this week, with simple but appropriate exer
cises, the first buildings of the Law Quadrangle were formally
declared devoted to the splendid purposes of our benefactor,

William W. Cook. On that day the late James Parker Hall, then Dean of
the University of Chicago Law School, said in his address:
"As we dedicate today the Lawyers' Club, the initial realization of
that beautiful quadrangle of law whose remaining buildings will soon
take shape, we stand on the threshold of a fine and worthy adventure for
the betterment of our ancient profession. The temple reared by human
hands is before us. It remains for it to be possessed by the spirit of human
service for which these cloisters are a fitting habitation. Into it will be
poured the labors of devoted teachers and scholars, the efforts of stu
dents, the support of alumni, and the co-operation of the profession;
and out of it will come, in the fullness of time, an influence that will
work mightily for the improvement of our law and its administration in
the state and in the nation. Its mission will be conceived in no narrow
spirit. It will teach students. It will train scholars. It will hold up high
ideals for the profession. It will inspire and help other schools to follow
its example. And above all it will labor to simplify and clarify the law, to
fashion it to our changing needs, and to keep it the flexible instrument of
social progress that is the difficult and crowning achievement of human
9
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institutions. To no purpose less high and noble can this beautiful gift be
dedicated. "
These words of a high-minded and generous-hearted friend are so
eloquent of the aspirations and purposes of those of us who are espe
cially charged with the task of breathing life and spirit into the noble
housing of the School which Mr. Cook has made possible for us, that I
can do no better than to quote them, as expressive of the thoughts and
purposes which crowd upon us on this significant day in the history of
our Law School.
A great gift creates obligation on the part of the beneficiaries. Rich
opportunity has its inescapable correlative, the duty to strive for the
richest and fullest realization of the opportunity. Conventional and trite
though these reflections may be, I should fail to express the dominating
thought and purpose of the University in general, and of the Law School
especially, if I refrained from giving expression to them. For, in deep
appreciation of the munificence of the gift, and recognizing the respon
sibility which it puts upon us, we have studied every possibility of
utilizing this beautiful group of buildings, and the equally important
endowment which accompanies it. We have been, and are, thinking and
planning that we may do our share in attaining the purposes which
motivated Mr. Cook in his great benefaction-purposes which we
share fully and unreservedly with him.
What are the great objectives to which Mr. Cook hoped to contribute?
Fortunately, in clear and forceful language, he has declared them in his
deeds of gift and in his will, and some of these words are graven in the
very structure of the beautiful buildings which he has given. In the
letter from him which was read at the exercises held here nine years ago
he said of the legal profession:
"There are few who tread its hot and dusty highway from end to end,
but those few mould public opinion instead of following it. But as an

FROM LEFT TO RIGHT: HENRY M. BATES, TAPPAN PROFESSOR OF LAW AND DEAN OF THE
LAW SCHOOL, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.

MARVIN B. ROSENBERRY, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE

ROSCOE POUND, CARTER PROFESSOR OF JURISPRUDENCE

AND DEAN OF THE FACULTY OF LAW IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
CIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

HARLAN F. STONE, ASSO
NEWTON D. BAKER, OF

THE CLEVELAND BAR, SECRETARY OF WAR 1916-1921.
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'intellectual aristocracy', it has not always led the way towards higher
standards of living. It is competent to do so and hence I do not think I
exaggerate when I say that the law schools are of supreme importance in
this respect to the future institutions, beliefs and conduct of life in
America. ''
And he closed his dynamic message in these words:
"Can your Law School be made a great center of legal education and
of jurisprudence for the good of the public? I believe it can and in that
belief shall press on. "
In his will occurs this significant passage, which elaborates the epit
omized statement just read and affords striking proof that his gift was
inspired by no mere institutional pride or limited by parochial or pro
vincial or class vision and aspiration:
"Believing as I do that American institutions are of more consequence
than the wealth or power of the country; and believing that the preserva
tion and development of these institutions have been, are, and will con
tinue to be under the leadership of the legal profession; and believing
also that the future of America depends largely on that profession; and
believing that the character of the law schools determines the char
acter of the legal profession, I wish to aid in enlarging the scope and im
proving the standards of the law schools by aiding the one from which
I graduated, nat�ely the Law School of the University of Michigan. "
It was this breadth of view, this recognition that law is but a means to
great ends, this generous desire to contribute to the welfare of all classes
in the nation, that commanded the immediate, profound and enduring
sympathy and determination of the law faculty.
It is possible to believe that Mr. Cook exaggerated the power and
influence of the American Bar, but there are those of us who know, from
intimate conversations with him, that he was deeply conscious of its
defects and its failures, and it must be remembered that he was addressing
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his words to lawyers and making his gift to them as at once a stimulus
and an aid to the realization of the sound ideals of the professipn. And
he could not have made his gift at a more opportune time in American
history, for who can doubt that today America is struggling desperately
and confusedly in a period more critical than that of which John Fiske
wrote. The years stretching from the winning of our national inde
pendence to the establishment of the national government, under the
Constitution, though desperate indeed, were characterized by dangers
and difficulties which seem relatively simple, if not superficial, as com
pared with the baffling and fundamental problems of our day. It was a
question then as to whether government could command the financial
and other support necessary for effective life, whether the states could
be kept in union, whether they could be restrained from opposing and
weakening each other, in their insensate industrial and trade rivalries.
But after all, the true path was fairly clear to the leaders of that day, and
the task was chiefly to surmount known difficulties and to harmonize
differences of political and economic interests, which did not reach down
into the depths or fundamentals of life.
We were beset then with the rivalries of the relatively small states of
one nation, with a population which after all was homogeneous through
out and for the most part shared somewhat the same set of rather
definite opinions and desires. Today we find ourselves engaged in the
gigantic and bitter international conflicts of a world which seems to have
lost its way, paralyzed by befogging doubts, and blinded by political and
trade rivalries. More presaging of disaster than commercial or political
antagonisms is the fact that we seem to have lost faith in those ideas of
government, of religion and of ethics, which for centuries, whether
right or wrong, have exercised a stabilizing influence and have given
direction and some sense of security in our national life.
The uncertainties and clashing opinions concerning such important
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institutions and standards as these are characteristic of periods of acute
transition. They are, in fact, an inevitable product of changing condi
tions. What these changes are is well known. Doubtless they are being
recited upon a thousand Commencement platforms, this month. Suffice
it to say here that they are fundamental, in some respects revolutionary,
and far-reaching beyond anything in modern history. Law is a resultant
of the industry, commerce and thinking-in short, of the life-of the
community. It has, of course, its reciprocal influence upon that life, but
it is no longer thought of as an unyielding mold to which life must be
forced to conform. If this be so, one has only to compare the national
industry, commerce, transportation and beliefs of 1789 with those of
today, to realize that unless adjustments had been made in our legal
order it could not have survived.
Furthermore, it follows that the process of modification must be con
tinuous, and that in a period of acute transition like this, modification
must take place with comparative rapidity. Without such modification
the national life would be partially frustrated, if not disrupted. Fortu
nately, neither the temper nor the habit of the American people is con
ducive to violent and sudden change, in matters of fundamental impor
tance. But reliance upon habit and a supposed temper, in these matters,
must not be pressed too far. We must set about making necessary
changes as intelligently and as scientifically as possible. It is this situation
which makes Mr. Cook's gift so timely, and which offers to the law
schools of the country extraordinary opportunity for service to our
national life.
How great that opportunity is may be indicated by reference to a few
American institutions which are undergoing great strain and stress, and
which many fear are disintegrating to a degree menacing to the future of
the republic. First, let us consider for a moment the unquestionably
changed attitude among our people toward law in general and especially
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toward what is sometimes called distributive justice, and the function of
the courts in its administration. For approximately a century after the
adoption of the Federal Constitution American law remained relatively
static. It was assumed to be based upon fundamental and immutable
principles, and that it was the duty of the courts only to declare the law
in relation to cases pending before them. The country was blessed with
a few masterful judges and legal scholars, such as Marshall, Kent, Story,
Calhoun, Webster and Cooley. But courts, for the most part, applied
precedent somewhat slavishly, and law was studied and taught dog
matically. Then toward the end of the last century dynamic changes in
the life of the nation had begun to influence our thinking and treatment
of law. Mr. Justice Holmes and Dean Pound were the influential leaders
who aroused the country, and particularly the Bar, to a fresh and more
philosophical, and at the same time a more realistic, attitude toward law
and its administration. Generative seeds sown by these and other men
have produced a most healthful ferment in the realm of legal scholarship.
But contemporary scholars are by no means all moving along the same
paths. At least two divergent, if not opposed, movements or tendencies
are observable. One may be said to be

a

priori and conceptual in character,

while the other has been dubbed realist or functional.
In some of the jurisprudential writing of the day the differences
between these movements has been greatly exaggerated. In retrospect, at
least, it will be seen that the divergencies are, for the most part, those
of degree and emphasis. Law never has been and never should be based
wholly upon

a

priori assumptions, on the one hand, or upon a merely

pragmatic philosophy, on the other. Whether there be immutable prin
ciples of justice or not, every national society has its beliefs, its standards
and traditions, which must and should have a large controlling influence.
Principle cannot be thrown out of the window without ensuing anarchy.
One has only to examine the earlier reported cases in early English
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jurisprudence to realize that in the days of the Year Books, as now,
principle and fact, in the large sense, have combined to fashion our law.
But there have been periods in which principle, embalmed and crystal
lized in authority and precedents, has become devitalized.
But in this year of grace, principle is being revitalized and made con
formative to the life of our day. Facts are having their innings, and by
facts, of course, are meant not the mere petty and particular details of
litigated cases, but the whole factual background and environment. And
so it is that legal scholars are investigating the actual functioning of the
nation's industrial and commercial life, and are seeking pertinent infor
mation to be found in the various social sciences, particularly, in the
hope of arriving at a just appraisal of our existing legal order and of
modifying and improving it, if and when desirable. But the difficulties
and pitfalls in these pursuits are great and numerous. Many a beautiful
prospect of correcting the existing scheme of justice, already has been
found to be but a delusion, issuing out of a quagmire of jumbled and
uninterpreted facts.
Nevertheless, unquestionably our law, like all other human institu
tions, needs correction in many respects. Readjustment to the life and
purposes of our time must be accomplished if we are to achieve a better
life. Here is a great and unlimited field for the legal scholar. He, better
than anyone else, is equipped to work toward that blend of principle,
authority, and conformity to the constantly changing life of any vital
people, necessary to an effective and prosperous society.
Other basic questions which offer great opportunities for study are
the three fundamental features of our Constitution. These may be said
to be, first, the division of governmental powers between the United
States as a Federal Union, and the several states; second, the distribution
of the powers of government, both Federal and state, into legislative,
executive, and judicial departments; third, the exercise by our courts of
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the power of review of legislation for the purpose of determining its
constitutionality. All three of these constitutional arrangements are being
subjected to tremendous strain. Indeed, there are many who feel that the
first two of those organic provisions have been undermined and partially
nullified, and as to the third, organized and determined efforts are being
made materially to restrict, or wholly to destroy, the power of judicial
review of legislation.
It must be apparent that material alteration of those three fundamental
arrangements of our constitutional law would vitally affect our entire
national structure and life. It is equally apparent that, to the extent to
which such changes are likely to be made, we should proceed with ex
treme care and should fashion the changes in the manner, and to the
extent, indicated by comprehensive and scientific study of every aspect of
the problems presented. Unfortunately, changes in the political and
legal structure of the nation are seldom, if ever, made in a scientific
fashion. Alterations come as the result of irresistible pressures of popular
beliefs (too often fallacies), and the

coup d1 etats of political parties and

of other organized pressure groups. But at least careful studies by legal
scholars of the situations in which changes seem indicated may con
tribute to better results than otherwise would be obtained.
There is perhaps no greater field for fruitful study than that basic

desideratum1 a sound division of powers between the Federal Union and

the several states. The Constitution itself affords no definite basis upon
which the decision can be made. The reservation to the states, or to the
people, of those powers not granted to the Federal government, nor
prohibited to the states, is far from being a rule of thumb, by which it
is possible to make the division of powers, under modern conditions.
If the powers granted to the Federal government were definite and un
changing powers, the problem would not be so difficult; but the fact is
that the grants are,

111

most respects, general in terms and capable of
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expansion and contraction as conditions change. The powers reserved to
the states are not specific or definite; they are residuary. Thus we find
that the treaty-making power, the powers to regulate interstate com
merce, to tax and to maintain the postoffice, may vitally affect matters
which primarily fall within the range of state control.
Nor can limits to Federal power be set by declaring that the govern
ment of the United States possesses no police power. That assertion has
often been made because of a restri�ted and erroneous theory as to the
nature of the police power, which had an undeserved vogue, especially
during our early history. Of course the Federal government possesses
police power, -not in its complete range, -but all police power apper
taining to its granted powers. And so the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the case of

Brooks

v.

the United States) 267 U. S. 432) in up

holding a certain congressional act, says: "In doing this it (Congress) is
merely exercising the police power for the benefit of the public, within
the field of interstate commerce."
The doubts which exist today as to how far the "New Deal " legisla
tion and the codes adopted thereunder may be validly applied to the
industry and business of the country, are most perplexing. There are
numerous Supreme Court decisions sustaining the exercise of Con
gressional power in relation to certain aspects of business, which, stand
ing apart, would be held to be wholly local. But because of the reaction
of these local businesses upon interstate commerce, and because the grant
of interstate commerce power is plenary, the courts have held that it
may be exerted upon these local businesses, if they vitally affect interstate
comn1erce.
In last analysis, decisions as to whether the exercise of Congressional
power in relation to such matters is valid or not will depend not upon
precise expressions in the Constitution, nor upon any mere rules of law,
but upon the application of broad principles and standards afforded by

20
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the Constitution, interpreted in the light of existing facts and applied
thereto. Economic and general social considerations have exercised, and
will continue to exercise, irresistible pressure for increase in the exertion
of Federal powers. On the other hand, there is undeniable danger in the
amassing of great powers in the Federal government and in the relative
loss of power and prestige by the state and local governments. How can
the clashing interests and principles involved be so reconciled as to
secure the greatest possible good? Is it not clear that here is a precious
opportunity for universities like this and others represented here today,
with their specialists in the fields of law, economics, political theory,
sociology and history, to examine this great governmental problem
objectively and to furnish material for those charged with the respon
sibility of governmental action?
Another great opportunity is afforded by study of the problem of
adjusting to the needs of contemporary society the basic requirement of
our constitutional system-that the powers of government shall be
separated and distributed to different arms of government.
Correct solutions of the basic political and legal problems thus inade
quately touched upon would doubtless go far toward the solution of
another perplexing controversy, which in a sense lies athwart our whole
national life, namely-that of determining a scientifically sound balance
and adjustment between individualism and collectivism. It is said that
the American people are by temperament disposed to individualism.
Probably this is true of a great majority of us, but we cannot close our
eyes to the fact that the tremendous increase in our population, and the
conditions of modern industrial society, have made anything like com
plete individualism impossible. Whether we like it or not, individualism
in its extreme form has been largely crushed out of existence, not by
government, but by the voluntary movements of society and the in
creased tendency toward the organization of great pressure groups. For
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example, how much play for individualism has the unskilled worker, and
most skilled workers, in securing employment from the massed and
organized industry, which is so characteristic of modern society? To
attain some approximation toward equality in bargaining for employ
ment, labor has organized itself into great unions, within which it per
mits practically no individualism whatever. So it is that in many indus
tries today the energetic, able and intelligent worker must control his
output of work and find his wages limited by the necessities of less
capable and less conscientious workers. It is idle to rail against govern
ment for developing socialization of modern life, in view of the compre
hensive and large-scale limitation of individualism by organized em
ployers, organized workers, organized merchants and consolidated
transportation agencies. The extreme individualism of the
and the

r

8th century

laissez faire policies of John Stuart Mill have little place in

modern society.
The contemporary political and popular discussion of this subject is
characterized very largely by prejudice, self-interest, and ignorance of
fact, and it creates far more heat than light upon the subject. Here again,
in perhaps the most fundamental and the most important of all problems
to be settled by modern society, there is golden opportunity for calm,
objective and scientific study of the matters involved.
I have surveyed all too sketchily a few of the outstanding legal prob
lems of our time, and those few all in the domain of public law. But our
entire legal order bristles with vexed questions and friction points which
incite the scholar to renewed labor, to invigorated, imaginative, profound
research, that he may contribute his mite to the amelioration and the
sound prosperity of our national life. And I have said little that, in a
superficial sense, would seem to relate to teaching, and teaching is after
all a primary obligation of any school. But in a truer, more profound
sense, all that has been said concerns the well-springs from which all
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vital teaching must arise. In the eloquent words of Mr. Justice Holmes:
''The aim of a law school should be . . . not to make men smart, but to
make them wise in their calling-to start them on a road which will lead
them to the abode of the masters. . . . Education, other than self-educa
tion, lies mainly in shaping men's interests and aims. If you convince a
man that another way of looking at things is more profound, another
form of pleasure more subtile than that to which he has been accus
tomed-if you make him really see it-the very nature of man is such
that he will desire the profounder thought and the subtiler joy. So I say
the business of a law school is not sufficiently described when you merely
say that it is to teach law, or to make lawyers. It is to teach law in the
grand manner and to make great lawyers. " And you cannot teach law in
the grand manner upon an accumulation of stale information. The
material of instruction must be kept fresh and vital by constant research.
Mr. Cook has accompanied his gift of buildings and endowment with
a statement of his hopes and purposes, which are comprehensive and
liberal. He has wisely refrained from hampering those who must
administer his foundation by imposing upon them rigid conditions or
meticulous details as to methods or materials. But his generating thought
and his central plan are crystal-clear. Without denying to those working
in other fields their part in the preservation of sound American institu
tions, he has declared his conviction that the American Bar and American
Law Schools have had, and in the future should have, a great and influential
part in shaping American life. Therefore, he has provided that his gift
shall be used by the School of which he was a graduate, not only for the
teaching of law and the training of superior lawyers, but for the scientific
study of law, in its most comprehensive sense, that the School may make
its contribution to a better Corpus Juris and a better American life.
Mr. President, the Faculty of our Law School are deeply grateful for
the priceless opportunity which is theirs, through Mr. Cook's idealism
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and generosity. And equally, and with genuine humility of spirit, they
recognize the great responsibility and obligation which rest upon them.
They pledge themselves now, as we dedicate the superbly beautiful
structures in which the work is to be carried on, to strive with all the
strength and wisdom they may command for the realization of the lofty
ideals of the brilliant American lawyer, to honor whose memory and
ideals we have met here today.

Law and Laws
1n the Twentieth Century
By ROSCOE POUND

Carter Professor of Jurisprudence and Dean of the Faculty of Law
in Harvard University
E ARE here to dedicate a magnificent group of buildings

W

built from the munificence of a lawyer to be devoted to the
teaching of law and to research in law. For three quarters of

a century, a great state has maintained here a notable law school. It has
been a school in which law has been taught, not merely to the people of
the state, but in such wise as to bring here a national student body to
learn a national law. Its wise founders had, it may be, builded better
than they knew. For in making of the law school of the state a school for
the nation they had better provided for the needs of the state in the era
of economic unification which has supervened. Also it has been a school
from which have come great law books, used in every part of the land,
which have helped to give shape and content to American law. Now to
this work of the state there is added a great private endowment-out
standing in a land and a time of lavish endowment of education and
scientific research-the first adequate endowment for the teaching and
study of law and for the scientific investigation which in other fields has
come to be our chief reliance for making human activities effective for
their ends. What may we hope from these buildings? What may we hope
from the work to be carried on here for generations to come which shall
justify the founder as the work of the past had justified the state?
25
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We have been told recently that there are but two necessary callings.
We have been told that two only will maintain themselves in the ideal
state of society into which we are entering, namely, that of engineer and
that of physician. In this ideal society, it seems that although through
the development of psychology men will have reached such n<ental and
moral power of voluntary control that no experts in organized social
control will be needed, they will still have need of further mechanical
devices and will still have grievous bodily ailments. We shall not reach
mechanical perfection nor bodily perfection. But political and economic
perfection are to do away with all experts and specialists other than those
who have to do with the physical existence. Such pronouncements are
characteristic of the era of machinery. If physics itself has been turning
of late to logic, if not to metaphysics, the modes of thought of the time
have been fashioned to the mold of the cocksure Victorian physics and
look to it for a model for the social sciences. Physical science did such
great things in the last and in the present century that its prophets are
forgetful of the conquest of internal nature which had made the progress
of physics possible-which has made possible division of labor and
setting free of inventive genius to discover things-and would rest the
whole of civilization upon man's mastery of external nature.
In all times of political optimism two ideas have had much currency
with the lay public. One is that somehow a social order may be attained
in which no administration of justice will be needed. The other is that
so long as administration of justice is necessary, justice would be better
administered if there were no authoritative body of legal precepts and
no adherence to the course of decision in the past, but each case were
determined by the common sense and sense of justice of a strong and
upright judge unhampered by rules or technical principles or technical
conceptions. Today this idea takes the form of belief in boards and com
missions and administrative officials, adjusting human relations and
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directing individual conduct on a conception of each case as unique, to
be disposed of without reference to any other, with a strong hand or on
such considerations of fair play or sympathy for the oppressed or weaker
party or of distribution of the economic surplus as appeal to them for the
time being. The ideal is taken to be a society of just men who require no
law and just judges who are equal to administering justice without law.
Things are not so simple as is assumed in the lay notion that if men
were just there would be no need of law. Just men may and do differ
justly as to many difficult questions of adjustment of human relations.
For example, the law has continually to fix the incidence of loss as
between persons wholly or equally blameless, or as between persons
equally or alike culpable. Thus in cases of injury where there is con
tributory negligence, no less than five methods of imposing or distribut
ing the loss are possible and any practicable solution of this problem of
who shall bear it is at best a compromise.
Also it happens often that in order to maintain the general security
the law must require a definite course of action as to matters which are
morally indifferent. Take, for example, the questions which arise when
one makes something new by using another's materials. The Roman
jurists of the classical period were not agreed as to the principles of
deciding with respect to ownership in such cases and Justinian adopted
a conclusion of his own quite different from that of either of the second
century schools. The modern codes do not agree with each other nor
with the Roman law on these cases, and the French Civil Code adopts
no rule but leaves the matter to be dealt with by the courts on the facts of
each case. The common law does not agree with the Roman law in these
situations nor do common-law jurisdictions agree with each other. The
explanation is that the exigencies of the economic order demand that
there be certain rules determining the ownership of property. But in
these and other cases decisions have to be made upon questions which
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have no clear moral import and upon which there are no received views
in current morality. The just man has been provided by nature with no
sufficient apparatus, merely because he is just, for dealing with such
cases. An ideal justice without technicality will not uphold the economic
order where maintenance of the security of transactions and security of
acquisitions calls for rules as to matters morally indifferent.
Nor, if I may revert to my first example, is it possible to maintain the
general security on the basis of the judgments of just men as to moral
blameworthiness at the crisis of particular actions. Intentional aggressions
and culpable carelessnesses are not the only things which menace the
general security in the crowded, machine operating, complex social order
of the time. Claims to security and claims to spontaneous free action
have to be harmonized and the task of reaching a workable adjustment
for each case would make impossible an adequate disposition of the
thousands and tens of thousands of controversies upon the dockets of
the courts of our large cities. Experience has shown abundantly the need
of objective standards both for the guidance of judges and administrative
officials and for measures of conduct for the individual. Indeed, in spite
of the juristic theory of the last century, which sought to make liability
absolutely dependent upon fault, there has been a steadily increasing
development of standards to which the legal order requires men to con
form at their peril. It is idle to speak of such things as "technical" and of
the technique of applying them as "legalism. " If one sees only the indi
vidual case and measures it by a conventional moral label applied with
reference to but one of the conBicting or overlapping interests involved,
it may seem that the legal solution leaves out elements which from a
moral or economic or social standpoint should be decisive. It cannot be
denied that this does sometimes happen. But in most cases it is rather
the so-called common sense solution which overlooks elements that in
the long run prove to be crucial for a practicable adjustment. The lay-
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man's method of valuing by affixing conventional moral labels is itself
crudely technical. Every practical art has technicalities of the same sort
as those of the legal order, expressing generations of experience and
enabling all that men have learned in a long process of civilization to be
applied intelligently to the problem of the moment. The most just of
men will need an apparatus of technicalities and a technique of applying
them, or in the alternative a technical adviser, if he is to act justly and effec
tively in the conduct of enterprises in a complex social and economic order.
A corollary of the idea that ideal justice would proceed without law
is that an ideal administration of justice would go on without lawyers.
But it may be said with entire truth that there is no systematic social
control in a developed politically organized society without lawyers.
Law, as we know it in a developed state, begins with lawyers. It begins
when the tradition of conduct of transactions, decision of causes, and
advising parties to controversies becomes secularized and passes into the
hands of a specialized profession. At Rome a turning point is reached
when the traditional formulae of actions are divulged and when, some
what later, the first plebeian pontifex maximus begins to give consulta
tions in public so that students may attend and take notes. Modern law
has its beginnings when Roman law became the rival of the law of the
church and presently set itself free from clerical control. In English
legal history, the supremacy of the king' s courts, which gave us the com
mon law, might well be dated from the Constitutions of Clarendon
which put definite and narrow limits to the jurisdiction of the ecclesias
tical courts. Likewise, in colonial America, especially in New England,
the history of law begins when the administration of justice begins to
come into the hands of professional lawyers, after a regime of magisterial
and legislative justice carried on chiefly by means of clerical and military
magistrates. Justice according to law is justice administered by lawyer
judges aided by lawyer advocates.
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An example of the task of the legal order may be seen in the age long
struggle to reach some workable adjustment between the claims of the
general security and those of free individual life in the law as to associa
tions. In all times and everywhere the activities of different forms of free
association have driven lawmakers and jurists to seek practical means of
limiting legally the individual interest in free association so that its
exercise shall not be allowed, on the one hand, to tie down too tight
each individual's claim to free self-assertion, nor, on the other hand, to
threaten the supreme authority of the state and thus impair the social
control on which civilization rests. Legislators and courts and jurists
have had to find how the natural human power of combined action can
be curtailed without taking from freedom much of its worth and yet
how to leave it unchecked without taking away much of the freedom of
others or destroying the power of government. The naive view which
sees a society without lawyer's law, in which natural justice is adminis
tered for each case by just men applying their ideas of justice for the
time being, sees in such problems merely the selfish greediness of em
ployers or the selfish grasp for power of labor leaders or the unreason
ableness of workingmen. But the matter is not so simple. It is a phase of
the task of reconciling the demands of the general security with those of
the individual life which is fundamental for social engineering. Thus
far, no one has been able to harmonize the two overlapping or conflicting
interests-the interest in individual freedom and the interest in free
association-otherwise than by some sort of compromise. This com
promise, as in so many cases in the legal order, has to be worked out by
experience of what will secure the most of human claims with the least
friction and the least waste. When a working compromise is found, it
will in a sense be "technical." It will be expressed in a legal formula to
be applied by a legal technique. Very likely doctrinal writers will develop
it further and work out certain resulting legal conceptions. Without such
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an organization of experience by reason the task of adjusting these
claims in any particular case of clash would be hopeless in any society of
much economic development.
For another example consider the questions which arise in connection
with defamation. A newspaper receives and publishes in good faith what
on its face is an innocent item of news which, nevertheless, under cir
cumstances not appearing on its face is grievously defamatory of an
innocent person. Or, a man receives information under circumstances
making it credible, which, if true, shows that an employee of a neighbor
is so misconducting himself as to threaten serious loss to the neighbor.
Under a conviction of moral duty he communicates the information to
the employer and as a result an innocent employee is discharged. Here
we must seek a compromise between claims of freedom of speaking and
writing, claims to one's honor, reputation, and4 peace of mind, and
claims not to be injured in one's substance. In general, in the United
States in the practical workings of the established legal compromise it
allows much freedom of publication but affords relatively little protec
tion against defamation. In England, it protects against defamation but
the press considers that it unduly curtails freedom of writing and pub
lishing. It is largely because there are so many cases where no wholly
satisfactory adjustment is possible, that so much of the law is apt to
appear so technical. The party whose interests remain unrecognized or
under-secured will regard the process as arbitrary or technical or legalis
tic, as the phrase may be at the moment.
Historically, and in particular in the matter of our political and legal
institutions, we are an English people. Hence our political institutions
are legal and our legal institutions are political. It is in our inheritance
to govern according to law and to exact of all in authority that they
e·xercise the authority reasonably and to the ordered measure of law. But
we are also a new-world people and so an impatient people, with faith in
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doing things and expecting to do them rather than leaving them to do
themselves. We are loth to await the slow processes of history whereby
experience points out the practicable paths of progress. Thus we rely on
the one hand upon law, and on the other hand upon laws. The balance
between these two sides of our legal and political character has always
been hard to maintain. The last century stressed reliance on law and
ordered formulation of experience. The present inclines instead to laws
and stresses creative legislation and administration. If it is to be the
function of a science of law to make experience and creative genius
effective for the ends of the legal order by wise appraisal and sound
formulation of the one and intelligent direction of the other, Mr.
Cook's foundation comes at the psychological moment.
Law is something more than an aggregate of laws. Laws are rules. But
law is much more than a body of rules. Law gives life to rules. Law is
needed to make laws instruments of justice. Rules are made in advance,
sometimes to formulate experience, more usually on rationalist ideas of
social advantage, not infrequently to meet the exigent self-interest of
some vigorous, self-assertive group. Law arises from the application of
these laws and the endeavor of lawyers to make of them a coherent sys
tem, operating according to an ideal, and furthering justice. Principles,
conceptions, doctrines, a received technique of finding the grounds of
decision of cases and of advice to clients in the body of laws and the
principles, conceptions and doctrines built upon and around them, and
a body of received ideals by which application of laws and development
of rules are gl;lided, are the work of courts and jurists and lawyers and
constitute the law. Without law, laws are but empty formulas and law
can attain no effective development without lawyers.
In the Middle Ages, in an age of authority men sought to attain jus
tice through rules. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in an age
of rationalism, they sought to bring about justice through reason. In the
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maturity of the competitive individualist economic order in the nine
teenth century they sought it through metaphysically demonstrated and
legally guaranteed rights, whereby the fullest and freest self-assertion was
assured to each man. Today they are seeking it through legislation on a
social utilitarian theory of bringing about a maximum of social advan
tage, or through administrative individualization, without rules, without
regard to logical requirements, and regarding rights not as ends to be
safeguarded but as means toward scarcely apprehended social ends. We
may recognize that no one of these methods will attain justice in every
case and for every purpose. Traditional rules, reason, a logically orga
nized system of recognized and secured interests, creative thought har
nessed to the work of lawmaking, and intuition and discretion operating
through administrative hierarchies and tribunals have each contributed
to the legal order. Each has possibilities for the legal order of today and
of tomorrow. We are not to cast out any of them. Rather we must seek
to know how and when and where to use them and it may be to find how
to supplement them by such new instruments as we can discover. If the
watchword of the Middle Ages was authority, the watchword of the seven
teenth and eighreenth centuries reason, and that of the nineteenth century
freedom given effecr by rights, the watchword of today must be research.
Much of what gives us trouble in the legal order in twentieth-century
America is in the law, particularly in the ideal element in law, which
needs to be organized, criticized, and reshaped to the urban, industrial
society of the time. A gradual but well marked shift from the local to the
national or even universal, in a unified economic order, a shift from a
regime of individual acquisitive and competitive self-assertion to one of
co-operation, call for creative work in law, and as things are now much
research must go before that work. But much of what gives trouble is in
laws, and here, too, the remedy is not to give over laws or make more
laws, but to go forward in the development of law.
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There are those in our law schools who seem to deny that there is law
in the sense I am suggesting; who know single legal propositions or single
decisions or single instances, but deny the reality of principles and con
ceptions and doctrines, and

a

fortiori of ideals. But I submit that in such

a connection "real" means "significant." The technique of developing,
interpreting and applying rules of law, the ideals by which the processes
of developing, interpreting and applying them are directed, by which
content is given to formulas and conceptions, by which choice between
competing starting points for legal reasoning is determined, by which
interests are valued in order to recognize, delimit, and secure them intel
ligently-these are the enduring and significant elements in the legal
order. In the only sense in which the word "real" has any useful meaning
in jurisprudence, they are the real law. The rise of administrative boards
and commissions and tribunals seems to some to portend the end of law.
One might as truly say that they portend a new beginning. The tribunals
are called for by and in turn they call for more laws. More laws will
inevitably demand more law. We might well amend the classical state
ment of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights and seek a government of laws
applied and administered by men according to law.
In the economically unified America of today, the role of law in bind
ing together and harmonizing the diverse laws or bodies of rules of
forty-eight states goes far to make our system of separate local jurisdic
tions workable. Our received common-law technique has enabled the
law in each locality to develop rapidly in a rapidly developing land by
making it possible for the courts anywhere to avail themselves of the
sum of judicial experience and juristic activity everywhere. More than
this, law has made it possible for businesses and enterprises transcending
state lines-as all of any consequence must today-to function effec
tively under a welter of conflicting local laws.
Indeed, law had already had a like task before it in the Middle Ages.
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While the universities conceived of and taught a universal law, the
actual bodies of laws of local feudal jurisdictions and of the city-states
of medieval Italy were anything but universal. Each feudal jurisdiction
had its own peculiar local customs. Each Italian city-state had its own
statutes. With the growth of commerce and business enterprise questions
continually arose as to what legal precept governed a particular transac
tion or situation as between different local customs or local statutes,
where some of the parties lived or some part of the transaction took
place or something was to be performed. To some extent such questions
had arisen in the maturity of Roman law, as between diverse local cus
toms recognized and allowed a local force by the Roman legal polity.
But such questions arose on a large scale as between the Italian city
states of the Middle Ages, just as they have arisen on a large scale as
between the states of the United States in the last half century. Obvi
ously a workable solution had to be along universal lines. It had to be
one which would be acceptable in all of the jurisdictions concerned. It
had to be one appealing to jurists and judges everywhere. It would not
have done to seek to impose the traditions or received precepts of any
local system upon other localities. The universal ideal of the medieval
academic jurists was, therefore, exceptionally well fitted to be the back
ground of a solution. The Commentators, who were university teachers
of law, drew a theory from the Roman texts, with the received technique
of the civil law, and drew it so well on simple lines generally acceptable,
that the great subject of conflict of laws has kept to those lines ever
since. Here is one subject in the law governing private relations where
common-law lawyers and civilians understand each other and use the
same ideas and the same terms; where Story and Savigny are cited equally
throughout the world. It is due chiefly to the universal ideal of the
medieval jurists that a conflict of laws is not a conflict of law; that there
can be an orderly adjustment of relations and claims involved in inter-
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state transactions and enterprises notwithstanding the multiplicity of
divergent local laws. The conflict of laws is resolved and obviated by
the unity of law.
Much is said today in disparagement of what is called "legalism."
"Legalistic" is a current term of reproach. When these words have more
behind them than a vague hankering for offhand justice administered to
order by a strong man benevolently inclined, they refer to the reliance on
laws rather than on law by which in the last century men sought to main
tain the security of acquisitions and security of transactions; they refer
to the measuring of claims and items of conduct and situations by
rather than by

a

law

the law.

This distinction between law and laws, between

the law and

a

law,

perceived by some jurists from the beginnings of a science of law, has
given trouble to others from the beginning and has been denied by a
succession of sceptics or positivists or realists, as they have called them
selves at different times and in different places.
Men obey their rulers or conform to prescribed standards of social con
duct partly because they are constrained to do so or know or fear they
will be constrained to do so by the force of those who exercise authority
under politically organized society. Pardy, also, they do so because they
and their forbears and their fellows have been in the habit of so doing.
Pardy, again, they do so because, for whatever of many reasons, they feel
that they ought to do so. None of these conceptions of the basis of
obedience to the legal order is the whole story. Yet, since the Greek
philosophers of the fifth century before Christ, attempt has been made
to explain the legal order, and the body of authoritative precepts for
guidance of judicial and administrative action, and the judicial and
administrative processes wholly in terms of the one or the other of them.
Some Greek philosophers thought of laws getting their authority from
enactment and rules of ethical custom resting on convention, but also, in
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contrast with these, a higher type of precept getting its authority from
conformity with the nature of things or ideal of things. The realist of
today is in the right line of juristic descent from the Cynics who denied
that things were right with reference to an ideal and asserted that they
could only be just when measured by convention or enactment.
Under one set of names or another this contrast between enacted or
traditionally prescribed precepts, on the one hand, and ideals of what
legal precepts should be and how they should be applied, on the other
hand, has persisted into the present. The Romans distinguished the

ius

ciuile, the body of rules applicable to Roman citizens, on the one hand,
and ius naturale, a speculative body of principles expressing the nature
(i.e. , the ideal) of things, on the other. The Middle Ages recognized the
authority of the Roman texts, on the one hand, but a rationally demon
strated law of nature-the part of the eternal law or reason of the divine
wisdom governing the universe addressing an "ought" to reasoning
creatures-on the other hand. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
thought of an ideal code of rules, a body of ideal precepts derived from
reason. But in practice they assumed that the texts of the Roman law
were as a general proposition declaratory of those ideal precepts. For the
most part, the nineteenth-century jurists were in reaction from this
over-emphasis on the ideal and so swung to the other extreme. They
ignored the ideal as their immediate predecessors had ignored the actual.
They sought to give the precepts which had actual (as distinguished from
ideal) authority in the time and place a basis in the sovereignty of a
politically organized society or in history. In one of these views law was
no more than an aggregate of laws authoritatively established or received.
In the other, it was no less than all social control. In each there was no
place for ideals.
It is a commonplace that some kind of change has been taking place
in the economic order and that it must be reflected in laws and in law.
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Those who keep up the one tradition of juristic thought have preached
the economic interpretation of law and legal history or economic deter
minism or economic realism or most recently psychological realism.
They see primarily what takes place in the legal order and in the judicial
process and take it that it is significant as it takes place. Those who keep
up the other tradition have revived philosophical jurisprudence and see
significance in the development of new ideals reflecting more accurately
the economic order of the time. Very likely the adherents of the one
tradition are doing a needed work of clearing away. At any rate, it seems
to be the adherents of the other tradition who are doing and are to do the
building.
There must be a balance of what is and of what ought to be. No one
can study the history of precepts and conceptions and doctrines without
seeing that in law what is is constantly reshaped to the model of juristic
pictures of what ought to be. Yet we cannot ignore what is. It is just
this which has to be reshaped. Ideals do not realize themselves. Men
make them real by measuring and criticizing precepts, in their content
and in their operation, by them and taking them as goals of creative
thinking. A body of legal ideals not put to such use is wholly sterile. It
is a difficult feat to reconcile and bring into one system of juristic
thought stability and change, authority and reason, is and ought to be,
rule and discretion, legislation and administration, statutes and doc
trinal and judicial tradition. But such is the task of a science of law in a
period of growth and adaptation. Because we have to do with what
ought to be we are not to ignore what is. Yet our occupation with what
is has its justification in enabling us to establish what ought to be.
I do not forget that a "pure science of law, " resting on logic as the
science of law of the eighteenth century rested on reason, is expected in
some quarters to deliver us from subjectivity and uncertainty. In the
same way the analytical jurisprudence of the nineteenth century achieved
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an illusory certainty by postulating a ''pure fact of law,'' that is, by con
cerning itself with laws as distinguished from law. Such theories attain
a superficial solution of the problems of the legal order by relegating
them to other fields, where they will still await solution. It does not
help us to turn the problem of a measure of values for human wants and
claims and demands and the theory of selecting, recognizing, delimiting
and securing of interests over to a science of legislation or to the "politics
of law.'' Wherever we put them they remain fundamental questions of
the first importance and of the first difficulty. A science of law that does
not grapple with them is pedantic and jejune. If the law teachers do not
take them up scientifically, we shall go on in blundering legislative and
judicial and administrative quests for solutions for the purposes of par
ticular situations, and in a time of change when such help is most needed
laws will be without adequate help from law.
In the progressive movement of a generation ago new agencies of
direct popular lawmaking and direct popular adjudication were expected
to bring laws and the application of laws into accord with social advan
tage. After the lapse of a generation we may perceive that such methods
have achieved little or nothing. Despite the backwardness of law because
of received ideals out of touch with the social order of the time, the
enduring progress has been in the course of judicial decision and in the
adaptation of our legal tradition.
True, we lawyers must not flatter ourselves that even the most we can
do toward making the law what it ought to be will do the whole or, of
itself, perhaps the major part of making straight the paths of a coming
social and economic order. On the other hand, the part of the law will
not be a mean one. No new deals and no reforms and no social or
economic programs which may be expected to take enduring shape in
such time as we may foresee are likely to do away with the need of
adjusting human relations and fixing lines for human conduct in a finite
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world where all the demands of every one cannot be satisfied. Nor are
we likely to find super-magistrates or super-officials or super-commis
sioners to whom the royal prerogative of doing justice without law-of
adjusting conflicting claims and regulating relations and fixing lines of
permissible conduct pro

hac vice by the light of nature-may be en

trusted with any reasonable assurance of a balance between the general
security and the individual life. Our ambitious schemes of social reform
call not for fewer laws but for more laws, and so for more and more
effective law. Hence the call of the time is not for less training or less
specialization on the part of those who will have to do with the admini
stration of justice, but for more. Moreover, whatever other ends develop
or become recognized, the administration of justice bids fair to remain
a chief end of politically organized society and the legal order and law to
remain the chief agencies by which it attains that end. Nothing short of
anarchy at the one pole or the millennium at the other is likely to obviate
the social need for law and lawyers.
Let me be understood. I do not for a moment hold to the legal and
juristic pessimism of the last century. I should be the last to urge that
the law teacher is to sit by and observe and note, while some intrinsic
power of evolution develops a law for the twentieth century out of that
of the nineteenth. Faith in the efficacy of effort is one of the articles in
the creed of the jurist of today. But there are limits to what may be done
by means of laws and law, as a recent large scale experiment has made us
aware. The legal order is not equal to the whole task of social engineer
ing. No amount of creative lawmaking, however wisely developed by
law and applied by lawyers, can achieve all the purposes of social control,
can do all the work of maintaining, furthering and transmitting
civilization.
Moreover, in order to be effective, effort must be directed intelli
gently. It must take account of much which the rationalism of the last
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century failed to see. We cannot assume that social advantage is some
thing which he who runs may read. It is not something to be discovered
by a mere scrutiny of the phenomena of social life within the horizon of
the particular observer as he looks about him. Study of the legal order
in action, study of the social effects of legal precepts, study of how the
legal order attains or fails to attain its ends in particular situations and
why, must go on for a long time and in many places and must enlist the
best energies of many well trained investigators before we may act with
assurance upon many of the complex legal problems which are also social
and economic and political problems in America of today.
On another occasion I urged four points in this connection which I
venture to repeat. One is that the one-man research of the past, though
I agree that it may still do much, will no longer suffice for our greater
problems. Another is that the partisan made-to-order research which is
carried on under the auspices and for the purposes of trades and busi
nesses and organized interests, which has had so much to do with prepa
ration for recent American legislation, will but aggravate an increasingly
bad condition in our local lawmaking. Another is that research must be
done upon subjects as a whole, from a nation-wide or even world-wide
standpoint. Finally, it cannot be done fruitfully if under pressure to do
it in a hurry. It must be done cooperatively by scholars of many types
and in many subjects uniting their learning, their organized experience,
and their trained energies in a joint effort. It must be done not upon
single controversies as they arise, but upon the whole field out of which
they arise.
In Continental Europe, such things are committed to ministries of
justice. But such institutions are not in touch with the genius of English
speaking peoples and we may be long in setting them up. The alternative
is organized, systematic legal research in our universities, where it can
and will be carried on for its own sake in a purely scientific spirit. In the
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law schools of universities the conditions of effective quest for truth and
the guarantees of public confidence are assured. In the law school of a
state university there is already the foundation of a public ministry of
justice, and every university law school may be made the nucleus of an
effective American substitute.
A time of confident political enthusiasm is propitious for entering
upon projects of research in the operations and problems and ends of the
legal order. The present moment is not the first time in which we have
been confident that we were entering upon a new era of political and
legal perfection and that in a twinkling of an eye we should all be
changed. The great seal of the United States, as originally adopted, bore
the device

novus ordo saeclorum-a new order of the ages. The political

literature of the rise of Jeffersonian democracy is full of glowing
prophecies of a new politics and a new law, governed by reason and in
accord with a rationalist morals. If these anticipations were not realized,
nevertheless we must not forget that because the men of that age be
lieved they could do great things they were able to do great things-not
the least of them the framing of the Constitution of the United States
and the reshaping of the received English law of the seventeenth century
and making of it a law for the new world in the nineteenth century. It is
true, as we look back on the enthusiastic pronouncements of formative
America we see that much less was newly made of whole cloth than men
supposed. We see much continuity, legal and political, with seventeenth
century England. As legal historians look back hereafter they may very
likely see much continuity of their time with ours and of both with the
nineteenth century. But what will make it a continuity of living tissue
will be, if I see aright, the work of teaching and research in our law
schools, and not the least that which will have gone on upon this spot.
May the lawyers of the future be able to date a new era in the effective
ness of the legal order in the United States from this endowment for
law teaching and legal research.

Address
By HARLAN F . STONE
Associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States

W

E ARE met to commemorate an event, notable alike in the
history of this University and of our profession. For the
first time it has been given to an American university to

establish a unit completely organized and equipped for the training of
lawyers, for research in legal science, and for the intimate association at
a common meeting place of students and teachers of law with the mem
bers of the Bench and Bar. By that magic which only the modern world
has known, in a brief interval of time all the physical equipment which
skill and ingenuity could devise to aid those engaged in the common
enterprise of advancing the science of the law has been here assembled,
clothed in architectural forms of enduring beauty, and richly endowed
to insure its service in perpetuity. All this has come about through the
far-seeing generosity of a graduate of this University. To him it was
given to see a vision, as he in his own words has described it, of the
legal profession of the nation, profoundly influenced by its law schools,
taking its proper place in the development of American institutions.
What we here see and dedicate to this useful service is the tangible
evidence of his faith in that vision.
We meet at a time when, as never before in the history of the country,
our most cherished ideals and traditions are being subjected to searching
criticism. The towering edifice of business and industry, which had be
come the dominating feature of the American social structure, has been
shaken to its foundations by forces, the full significance of which we
47
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still can see but dimly. What had seemed the impregnable fortress of a
boasted civilization has developed unsuspected weakness and in conse
quence we are now engaged in the altogether wholesome task of critical
re-examination of what our hands have reared.
From this inquiry the law and the lawyer may claim no immunity. It
is true, if tradition and history are guides, that we may rightly look to
the Bar for leadership in the preservation and development of American
institutions. Specially trained in the field of law and government, in
vested with the special privileges of his office, experienced in the world
of affairs, and versed in the problems of business organization and
administration, to whom, if not to the lawyer, may we look for guidance
in solving the problems of a sorely stricken social order.
No tradition of our profession is more cherished by lawyers than that
of its leadership in public affairs. We dwell upon the part of lawyers in
the creation of the Federal Constitution and in the organization of the
national government and our federal and state judicial systems. The role
they played in politics and government in the first half of the last century
is a familiar part of our history. The records of the early Bar associations
in the thirteen original states afford convincing evidence that the lawyers
of the time took more than a perfunctory interest in the social obliga
tions of the profession. We find their Bar organizations actively super
vising and controlling membership in the Bar and setting standards of
admission to it higher than those which prevail in most of those states
today. In a very real sense they were guardians of the law, cherishing the
legitimate influence of their guild as that of a profession charged with
public duties and responsibilities. The great figures of the law stir the
imagination and inspire our reverence according as they have used their
special training and gifts for the advancement of the public interest.
Coke, standing steadfast against the encroachment of the crown on the
prerogatives of parliament; John Hampden, with his group of famous
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the courts the levy of ship money by the crown;

James Otis, the stalwart defender of the right of free speech, throwing
up his commission as Advocate General of Massachusetts to argue against
writs of assistance; John Marshall, with prophetic vision, welding the
clashing states into a united nation; all are names to which we recur as
symbols of the power of public leadership of the Bar at its best.
All this is justly the subject of pride to lawyers. The records of almost
any Bar Association meeting reveal our readiness to turn back to these
pages of a glorious past, because they portray those ideals of our pro
fession to which we would most willingly pay tribute. Yet candor would
compel even those of us who have the most abiding faith in our pro
fession, and the firmest belief in its capacity for future usefulness, to
admit that in our time the Bar has not maintained its traditional position
of public influence and leadership. Although it tends to prove the point,
it is not of the first importance that there are fewer lawyers of standing
serving in the halls of legislatures or in executive or administrative posts
than in earlier days. Public office is not the only avenue to public influ
ence. Representatives of other professions in public position have always
been comparatively few, but wherever questions of professional concern
to them touch the public interest, they are nevertheless profoundly influ
ential. In matters of sanitation and public health, in great public under
takings involving engineering knowledge and skill, we place ourselves
unreservedly in their hands. But it is not without its lesson for us that
most laymen, at least, would deny that there is today a comparable
leadership on the part of lawyers, or a disposition of the public to place
reliance upon their leadership where the problems of government touch
the law.
We cannot brush aside this lay dissatisfaction with lawyers with the
comforting assurance that it is nothing more than the chronic distrust
of the lawyer class which the literature of every age has portrayed. It is,
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I fear, the expression of a belief too general and too firmly held for us to
shut our eyes to it. One might cite a hundred examples but it suffices
that in the struggle, unique in our history, to determine whether the
giant economic forces which our industrial and financial world have
created shall be brought under some larger measure of control and, if so,
what legal devices can and should be selected to accomplish that end, it
is a matter of public comment that the practicing lawyer has been but a
minor participant. It is unnecessary, and it would be unbecoming for me
to express any opinion upon the merits of that controversy or the
methods of its solution. It is enough for present purposes that in one of
the most critical periods of our history, when a major public problem
is the choice of remedies for our economic ills and the mutual adjust
ment and reconciliation of those remedies with legal doctrine, the prac
ticing Bar of the nation has not attained its accustomed place of recog
nized leadership. Unless in this time of self-searching we are to abandon
the lawyer's habit of facing the realities of the world in which we live
and rest content to dwell on the happier recollections of another day, we
cannot avoid asking ourselves how our past, and the ideals which claim
our attachment, are to be reconciled with the disquieting circumstances
of our present, or whether the donor of this beneficent gift for the public
good was mistaken in his judgment that we may look to the legal pro
fession more than to other groups in our society for future public
leadership.
The coercive power of the state no doubt has its part to play in any
civilization. We cannot do without the policeman, yet we cannot count
his night stick as our most potent civilizing agency. In seeking solutions
for our social and economic maladjustments we are too ready to place
our reliance on what the state may command, rather than on what may
be given to it as the free offering of good citizenship, forgetting that 'in
doing so we give first place to the policeman's club. Yet we know that
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unless the urge of individual advantage has other curbs, unless we may
have recourse to other forces of social betterment, and unless the more
influential elements in society conduct themselves with a disposition to
promote the common good, society cannot function. This is the more
so in a society which has largely measured its rewards in terms of mate
rial gains. For as our conception of what is reward is less related to the
social welfare the problem of bringing individual conduct into harmony
with the demands of society becomes more acute, and in the economy of
today mere material gain to the individual may not in itself be the social
good it was once conceived to be.
Throughout the history of Anglo-American civilization, the pro
fessional groups have been among the most significant of those non
governmental agencies which promote the public welfare. Although in
smaller measure, during the rapid growth of our industrial system, their
function has been not unlike that of the medieval guilds. They have
exerted direct control over their members by training, by selection, by
punishment, by reward. Among these groups the position of the Bar
has been one of peculiar importance and significance. While it has not
inherited the completely independent status of the English Bar, to no
other group in this country has the state granted comparable privileges
or permitted so much autonomy. No other is so closely related to the
state, and no other has traditionally exerted so powerful an influence on
public opinion and on public policy. That influence in the past has been
wielded chiefly in the courts, in the forums of local communities, in legis
lative halls, in the councils of government. In all its varying aspects, it
has been most potent when public questions have been closely associated
with legal questions in whose discussion the lawyer was peculiarly at
home, and when, with a developed consciousness of its social responsi
bility, it was inevitable that the Bar should draw upon all its special
knowledge and skill and its resourcefulness for their solution.
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In appraising the present-day relationship of the lawyer to his com
munity, we cannot leave out of account either the altered character of
public questions or the change in the function which the lawyers, as a
class, have been called upon to perform. It was in r8o9 when Jefferson
wrote: "We are a rural farming people; we have little business and few
manufactures among us, and I pray God it will be a long time before we
have much of either. " Profound changes have come into American life
since that sentence was penned. The first half of the nineteenth century
saw the beginnings of a shift from that idyllic scene and in the second
half the transformation was complete from a young nation made up of
isolated groups of agricultural pioneer communities, scattered through
the vast territory east of the Mississippi River, to an industrial state, in
which, in our own day, we have witnessed the domination of law and
politics by inexorable economic forces. Public problems are no longer
exclusively questions of individual right. They involve an understanding
of the new and complex economic forces we have created, their bearing
upon and their relationship to the lives of individuals in widely sepa
rated communities engaged in widely differing activities, and the adapta
tion to those forces of old conceptions of law developed in a different
environment to meet different needs.
The American Bar, like most other elements in the life of the nation,
was ill prepared for a change so swift and sweeping. From the beginning
of the commercial expansion in England to almost our own day, the
problems of the law were those of an intensely individualistic society.
An adequate technique, and skill in using it, engaged the attention of its
practitioners. Its historical background and moral content, and more or
less abortive attempts to reform its procedure, were the chief considera
tions of its philosophers. When the universities, but a little more than
a generation ago, found place for its study, its expositors were at first
mainly concerned with its precedents and its technique. There was a
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persistent delving into its past, an a?siduous analysis of what courts had
done and the manner of their doing it, but little reflection upon the
relationship of the law to the social and economic forces which produce
it or contemplation of its function as a means of social control rather
than as an end in itself.
There was still less perception of the significance of the rise of new
forces in American life which, with constantly accelerated speed, were
reconstructing society upon an economic basis, with an ever-increasing
interdependence of its every group and part upon every other.
The changed character of the lawyer's work has made it difficult for
him to contemplate his function in its new setting, to see himself and
his occupation in proper perspective. No longer does his list of clients
represent a cross section of society; no longer do his contacts make him
the typical representative and interpreter of his community. The demands
of practice are more continuous and exacting. He has less time for reflec
tion upon other than immediate professional undertakings. He is more
the man of action, less the philosopher and less the student of history,
economics and government.
The rise of big business has produced an inevitable specialization of
the Bar. The successful lawyer of our day more often than not is the
proprietor or general manager of a new type of factory, whose legal
product is increasingly the result of mass production methods. More
and more the amount of his income is the measure of professional suc
cess. More and more he must look for his rewards to the material satis
factions derived from profits, as from a successfully conducted business,
rather than to the intangible and indubitably more durable satisfactions
which are to be found in professional service more consciously directed
toward the advancement of the public interest. Steadily the best skill and
capacity of the profession has been drawn into the exacting and highly
specialized service of business and finance. At its best the changed system
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has brought to the command of the business world loyalty and a superb
proficiency and technical skill. At its worst it has made the learned pro
fession of an earlier day the obsequious servant of business, and tainted
it with the morals and manners of the market place in its most anti-social
manifestations. In any case we must concede that it has given us a Bar
whose leaders, like its rank and file, are on the whole less likely to be
well rounded professional men than their predecessors, whose energy
and talent for public service and for bringing the law into harmony with
changed conditions have been largely absorbed in the advancement of
the interests of clients.
These changes have come upon us by imperceptible stages and almost
unrecognized. There has been no concerted effort of lawyers to bring
them about. Indeed, it cannot be said that they have been welcome to
the Bar, though one may doubt whether it could have resisted them
successfully, or whether it could have met the new demands upon it
except by some form of specialization necessarily involving a more or
less one-sided development of the profession as a whole.
I mention these changes now, not to condemn, but to describe them.
We can hardly suppose that they have not come to stay in something
like their present form, or that such evils as they have brought can be
combatted without intelligent action, taken with full knowledge of the
facts. Facts are stubborn but revealing things, and the first step toward
any form of social improvement is frank recognition of them. When we
know the significant facts in the professional life of the lawyers of the
present generation and appraise them in the light of the altered world in
which we live, we shall better understand how it is that a Bar which has
done so much to develop and refine the technique of business organiza
tion, to provide skilfully devised methods for financing industry, which
has guided a world wide commercial expansion, has relatively done so
little to remedy the evils of the investment market; so little to adapt the

Dedicatory Exercises
fiduciary principle of nineteenth century equity to twentieth century
business practices; so little to improve the functioning of the adminis
trative mechanisms which modern government sets up to prevent abuses;
so little to make law more readily available as an instrument of justice
to the common man.
Notwithstanding all the pressures of modern economic life upon the
lawyer, and his absorption with the demands of client-caretaking, w�
could make no greater mistake than to assume that ours has become a
profession without ideals. Even the lawyer's devotion to the interests of
his clients is a manifestation of a selfless loyalty to an ideal, though it
may not always be seen in true perspective in relation to the public in
terests which it is also his duty to serve. No one fan1iliar with the history
of the Bar, knowing its life and personnel, can doubt that it has the
idealism, the will to sacrifice, the capacity for leadership, which will con
tinue to enable it to play well its part. No professional class has greater
pride in its traditions or higher aspirations for its future. None will
respond more willingly, with generous expenditure of time and effort, to
the intelligent call for action. But none so much needs to know the
facts which reveal, in clear relief, its altered position in the social struc
ture and the manner in which under new conditions it is meeting its
public responsibilities. None, unless it be the scientists, can be more
profoundly moved by facts.
But like most other elements of the community we are in a sense the
victims of change·s, of whose nature and effect we are still not wholly
aware. Hence it is that the Bar needs to know and to focus its attention
upon the facts, not in the form of assumptions or generalizations, nor
yet on the details of petty misconduct in its disreputable outer fringes,
but upon data patiently assembled and organized so as to show with the
powerful impact of revealed truth the extent to which devotion to
private interests has obscured our vision of the public welfare. I pass over
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more familiar criticisms, to an example even more significant though less .
well recognized and appreciated.
I venture to assert that when the history of the financial era which has
just drawn to a close comes to be written, most of its mistakes and its
major faults will be ascribed to the failure to observe the fiduciary prin
ciple, the precept as old as holy writ, that "a man cannot serve two
masters." More than a century ago equity gave a hospitable reception to
that principle and the common law was not slow to follow in giving it
recognition. No thinking man can believe that an economy built upon
a business foundation can permanently endure without some loyalty to
that principle. The separation of ownership from management, the
development of the corporate structure so as to vest in small groups
control over the resources of great numbers of small and uninformed
investors, make imperative a fresh and active devotion to that principle
if the modern world of business is tb perform its proper function. Yet
those who serve nominally as trustees, but relieved by clever legal
devices from the obligation to protect those whose interests they pur
port to represent, corporate officers and directors who award to them
selves huge bonuses from corporate funds without the assent or even
the knowledge of their stockholders, reorganization committees created
to serve interests of others than those whose securities they control,
financial institutions, which, in the infinite variety of their operations,
consider only last, if at all, the interests of those whose funds they
command, suggest how far we have ignored the necessary implications
of that principle. The loss and suffering inflicted on individuals, the
harm done to a social order reared upon a business base and dependent
upon its integrity, are incalculable.
There is little to suggest that the Bar has yet recognized that it must
bear some burden of responsibility for these evils. But when we know
and face the facts, we shall have to acknowledge that such departures from
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the fiduciary principle do not usually occur without the active assistance
of some member of our profession, and that their increasing recurrence
would have been impossible but for the complaisance of a Bar too
absorbed in the workaday care of private interests to take account of
these events of profound import or to sound the warning that the
profession looks askance upon these as things that ''are not done.''
We must remember, nevertheless, that the very conditions which
have caused specialization, which have drawn so heavily upon the
technical proficiency of the Bar, have likewise placed it in a position
where the possibilities of its influence are almost beyond calculation.
The intricacies of business organization are built upon a legal framework
which the current growth of administrative law is still further elabo
rating. Without the constant advice and guidance of lawyers, business
would come to an abrupt halt. And whatever standards of conduct in
the performance of its function the Bar consciously adopts must at
once be reflected in the character of the world of business and finance.
Given a measure of self-conscious and cohesive professional unity, the
Bar may exert a power more beneficent and far reaching than it or any
other non-governmental group has wielded in the past.
If you think I have sketched too dark a picture of the difficulties
which beset us, I hasten to assure you that it is not from any counsel of
despair. I would only point out that in the new order which has been
forced upon us, we cannot expect the Bar to function as it did in other
days and under other conditions. Before it can function at all as the
guardian of public interests committed to its care, there must be
appraisal and comprehension of the new conditions and the changed
relationship of the lawyer to his clients, to his professional brethren
and to the public. That appraisal must pass beyond the petty details
of form and manners which have been so largely the subject of our
codes of ethics, to more fundamental consideration of the way in
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which our professional activities affect the welfare of society as a
whole. Our canons of ethics for the most part are generalizations de
signed for an earlier era. However undesirable the practices con
demned, they do not profoundly affect the social order outside our
own group. We must not permit our attention to the relatively in
consequential to divert us from preparing to set appropriate standards
for those who design the legal patterns for business practices of far
more consequence to society than any with which our grievance com
mittees have been preoccupied.
Aside from the procedure of formulating new methods of dis
cipline and new specifications of condemned practices, we must give
more thoughtful consideration to squaring our own ethical concep
tions with the traditional ethics and ideals of the community at large.
The problems to which the machine and the corporation give rise have
outstripped the ideology and values of an earlier day. The future de
mands that we undergo a corresponding moral readjustment. Just as the
lawyers of 17 9 o to 184o took a leading part in fashioning the country's
ideals to suit political change, so we must now shoulder the task of
relating them to business and economic change.
All this cannot be done in those occasional and brief intervals when
the busy lawyer secures some respite from the pressing demands of
clients to participate in the festivities of bar association meetings. It
requires study and investigation, the painstaking gathering of data and
their portrayal in such fashion that we may know the facts and, knowing
them, develop a consciousness of their implications for our profession.
With so much to be done w� must look to those elements in the
profession best qualified for doing it. A generation ago that search must
have begun and ended with practicing lawyers. But paralleling the de
velopment of the practicing bar has come, in the past fifty years, the
steady growth in public esteem and influence of a new force in American
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legal life, that of the rapidly increasing group of university law teachers,
devoting their lives to the task of advancing the cause of legal science
for which they have been specially selected and trained.
Members of the Bar, they nevertheless make up a distinct profes
sional group within the Bar. More detached than is the barrister from
the absorbing demands of clients and from those pressures of the new
economic order which have so profoundly affected their practicing
brethren, their approach to legal problems has been that of the dis
interested scientist. For a generation they contented themselves with.
the necessary work of analysis, clarification and statement of legal doc
trine. More recently, with penetrating insight, they have expanded their
inquiries to embrace the relation of law to the social forces which create
it, and which in turn it is designed to control. Today they are beginning
to turn their attention to the Bar as an institution, seeking to gain an
informed understanding of its problems, to appraise the performance of
its public functions and to find ways of stimulating a more adequate
performance of them. In all this they have rendered and are rendering
a public service of a high order.
With the ever increasing demands on the time and energy of the
practicing lawyer, it was but natural that it should fall to the lot of the
law school men to take the lead in discharging the public duties which
rest on the profession as a whole. It is they who have taken the initiative
in the most important reforms undertaken by the Bar in the past twenty
years. They originated and have chiefly guided the movements espoused
by the Bar for the enactment of uniform laws, the restatement of the
law, the improvement in standards of admission to the Bar, and the
reform of civil and criminal procedure. It is they who today represent
the most cohesive, disinterested and potent single force operating within
the profession to establish its public relationships on a higher plane. The
donor of this great educational center, in formulating his forward-
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looking plan, was not unfamiliar with this recent history of our pro
fession. He made no mistake in recognizing the law schools as an im
portant factor in it. Neither was he mistaken, I am convinced, in the
assumption, implicit in words, that the future would see the Bar
increasingly influenced by the work of the schools.
And so I turn to the part which our university law schools may take
in the study and promotion of the highest interests of the Bar. The
functioning of the Bar as an essential institution in present day Ameri
can life is worthy of research and exposition for the enlightenment of
the Bar and the public, such as only they can make. Their detachment,
their scholarly resources, their growing influence with the Bar, all indi
cate plainly enough that it is they who must take the more active part in
solving the problems which weigh upon our profession perhaps as
never before. They, as can no others, may assemble and portray the
facts which reveal, so that all may see, the manner in which the Bar is
performing its functions and, portraying them, stir the latent idealism
of lawyers to carry on.
It is equally true that the Bar cannot sit by and leave the burden
entirely upon the law schools. In the light of information which they
may make available the Bar must assume the responsibility of consciously
bringing its conduct to conform to new standards fitting the times in
which we live. And unless history reverses itself the cooperation and
support of leaders of the Bar will not be wanting. There could be no
more reassuring example of the possibility of drawing upon the re
serves of wisdom, patriotism and idealism of our profession in a coopera
tive effort to advance the public interest than that afforded by the
Institute of Law. For more than ten years the judges, the leading practi
tioners of the country and the representatives of our great schools of law
have united in the sustained, self-sacrificing, harmonious effort of the
Institute to bring order out of the chaos of some six centuries' accumula-
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tion of judicial precedent. One cannot doubt that a profession capable
of such a demonstration of its capacity for united and disinterested
public service can meet and solve these new and difficult problems.
Nor will such an effort want for public support. The lawyer in
America has reached his highest position in public esteem when public
questions have been in some degree identified with the forms of legal
right with which he is most familiar. The historic controversies, which
bore fruit in the bill of rights, the struggle against taxation without
representation, for immunity from arbitrary searches and seizures and
from writs of assistance, for the freedom of the press, for trial by
jury, involved questions with which the lawyers of the time, by training,
experience and inclination, were peculiarly fitted to deal. Public ques
tions were those with which the lawyer was most familiar. Today anti
social business practices which have not yet met with our refusal to
countenance them are equally in the public thought. It is true that the
parallel to the earlier era is not precise, for many of these practices are
still within the law, and to stand against them it is necessary that we
do more than defend legal rights, and that we look beyond the club of
the policeman as a civilizing agency to the sanctions of professional
standards which condemn the doing of what the law has not yet for
bidden. But in taking such a stand we may count upon the same support
which the lawyers of that earlier era had from the lay world. It was no
more vital to that day that free speech should be preserved than it is to
our own that those who act as fiduciaries in the strategic positions of our
business civilization should be held to those standards of scrupulous
fidelity which society has the right to demand.
There is opportunity, too, for a new emphasis in the training of the
young men who, thronging the lecture rooms of the law schools today,
will give character and direction to our profession tomorrow. From the
beginning the law schools have steadily raised their intellectual stand-
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ards. It is not too much to say that they have worshipped the pro
ficiency which they have sought and attained to a remarkable degree.
But there is grave danger to the public if this proficiency be directed
wholly to private ends without thought of social consequences, and
we may well pause to consider whether the professional school has done
well to neglect so completely the inculcation of some knowledge of the
social responsibility which rests upon public profession. I do not refer
to the teaching of professional ethics. I have no thought that men are
made moral by the mere formulation of rules of conduct, no matter
how solemnly bar associations may pronounce them, or that they may
be made good by mere exhortation. But men serve causes because of
their devotion to them. The zeal of the student for proficiency in the
law, like that of his elder brother at the Bar, comes from a higher source
than selfishness. It is devotion to his conception of a useful and worthy
institution. But that conception is a distorted one if it envisages only
the cultivation of skill without thought of how and to what end it is to
be used, and the question what the law schools have done and can do to
make that conception truer is one to be pondered upon and answered.
It is not beyond the power of institutions which have so successfully
mastered the art of penetrating all the intricacies of legal doctrine to
impart a truer understanding of the functions of those who are to be
the servants of the law. That understanding will come, not from
platitudinous exhortation, but from knowledge of the consequences of
the failure of a profession to bear its social responsibilities, and what it is
doing and may do to meet them.
And so I recur to the question which I raised a little time ago,
whether William W. Cook, the donor of this legal center and the
graduate and devoted friend of this University, was right in his belief
that we can continue to look to the Bar for the preservation and de
velopment of American institutions, and I answer it confidently in the
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affirmative. It will realize that expectation as he contemplated that it
would, through the growing influence of the law schools, whose char
acter, as he declared, determines the character of the legal profession
and through closer association and cooperation of this and other
schools of law in the worthy task of building up a new morale in the
profession, fitted to the new conditions under which it must do its
work. It is a happy augury for the future that the central idea around
which this institution, so nobly conceived, has been built is that the
continued capacity of the profession to guide the development of
American institutions involves an educational process in which its
schools rightly have their part.
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ACH stone plays its essential part in the total beauty of the
buildings which you are today dedicating. In a similar way each
legal institution, no matter how humble, contributes something

to the structure of the law. But just as a planned grouping of certain
stones imparts an especial dignity to these buildings, so we must
appreciate the peculiar value to the law of such institutions as Michi
gan's Law School. May your new buildings for the years to come nobly
serve their high purpose.
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By JAM ES 0. MURFIN
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Regent of the University of Michigan
THE University of Michigan this memorable day will long
be cherished. For our Law School it is epoch making. We do
not wish to be unduly boastful but are all supremely happy in

the conscious realization of the fact that thanks to the benefaction of
W. W. Cook we have a Law School equipment surpassed by none. Nor
is it in stone and mortar that our pride is planted-not more than in the
endowment which comes with this wonderful gift which, of course, in
time will be of incalculable value in advancing the science of legal educa
tion and this is a science. Rather our pleasurable satisfaction should
come to us because the Cook gift, its motive and its planned method of
operation have already created that intangible, non-definable condition
known as atmosphere.
There is already in and around our Law Quadrangle an atmosphere
that makes for the best thought; it makes for zest; it makes for a desire
to live up to the surroundings in which the student is located; and it
gives the study of law a morale that is marvelously beneficial.
While we are happy that Mr. Cook chose his Alma Mater as the
laboratory for his experiment our joy must not blind us to his motives
and our obvious duty. This gift was not primarily to our Law School as
such. It was not a gift backed by legal education as its primary thought.
Instead it was a gift designed and planned to benefit his Country, our
Country, the United States of America. It was his firm belief that the
future welfare of America depended upon the legal profession. His
66
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reading and his study led him to this conclusion. That was a fixed
opinion in his mind. He had entertained that opinion for .many years.
It was therefore not primarily for his profession that this gift was made
-it was for his Country. He believed the outstanding American insti
tutions, peculiar to our genesis and development, which have made our
country so outstanding, came into being and were largely preserved by
lawyers. He expected and hoped that lawyers would continue to carry
on in the future as he believed they had in the past. He fully believed in
the necessity of the Bar continuing to be leaders in the affairs of our
Country. Because of this belief he wanted to produce the best lawyers
possible-lawyers with the best education, the best background; he
wanted to aid and improve legal education; he wanted the law student
to have the best surroundings possible; he wanted to encourage and develop
the highest type of law study, but his primary motive in this benefac
tion was to produce better citizens and better servants for his Country.
With his high ideal before us should we not pause in the midst of our
pleasure and contemplate our duty? Are we to stop with a day of cele
bration? Are we going to be content with mere .contemplation? Rather, I
think, the Bar of America, the Bar of his Country, the Bar whose banner
we proudly carry, should individually here and now pause and in that
pause think of the background of this magnificent gift. We should then
and now dedicate part of our future action and part of our future lives
to aid with all in our power in carrying out this magnificent ideal.
. Our profession is still under public criticism. This is nothing new.
Hamlet, soliloquizing three hundred years ago, about the slings and
arrows of outrageous fortune, includes the bar as one of his major com
plaints. We all know there is some ground for complaint. There is
ground for complaint because there is always room for improvement.
Let us use this occasion-let us use the ideal of our donor as an oppor
tunity to pledge ourselves that every day and every way we will strive to
serve our Country better.

A Research Problem
Separation of Powers
By MARVIN B . R OSENBERRY

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
N THE nature of things William W. Cook must have pondered

I

many alternatives over the years which preceded his final determina
tion to place his residuary estate in the hands of trustees for the

purpose of advancing the study of law upon this Campus. He had
devoted practically his entire life to the practice and study of the law. He
had had most unusual opportunities to observe law in action. In the
course of his professional career he had dealt almost exclusively with
corporate organization and corporate finance. He had been a close-up
observer of the development of the modern corporation, a device which
has made possible the unprecedented economic development of this
country and at the same time created social problems of the most
difficult and complex character known to government. He had come in
contact not only with the leaders of the bar but with leaders in the fields
of industry, transportation and finance. His practice disclosed to him
the fact that many men in positions of leadership were not trained to
lead. Waiving the question of whether or not leaders can be discovered
and developed in schools, there remains the undeniable fact that a
trained leader is far better than one of equal natural ability, with
approximately the same experience, who is untrained. Mr. Cook would
have been the last to confine training to schooling. But the schools do
something in the way of training which practical experience does not
do. No doubt the converse is also true.
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While by the terms of the trust created by his will Mr. Cook gave
great latitude both to his trustees and to the beneficiary of the trust, it
is quite apparent from his scanty writings dealing with the matter, that
he had for many years sensed the fact that the law of this country would
shortly undergo profound changes. In recognition of this fact he first
determined to devote his fortune to the development of trained leaders
who might assist in directing through the teaching, practice and study
of the law, the operation of those social forces which he realized were
acting with increasing pressure upon our fundamental law. Having
made this basic decision, his second step was to decide that the leader
ship which he deemed essential to the continuity of our institutions
could best be developed in connection with an established law school.
When he had made these two decisions, he must have canvassed with
great thoroughness the possibilities in connection with various estab
lished institutions. In his search for the most strategic position for his
purposes, he naturally considered his Alma Mater. However, accustomed
as he was to deal with facts and realities, it is probable that mere senti
ment had little to do with his ultimate selection. It is noteworthy that
he finally chose an institution, which was, first, in the great Middle
West; second, tax-supported and administered by a state; third, closely
associated with a great university; fourth, having a faculty with a long
history of achievement in the field of legal education; and fifth, one
with a great body of loyal alumni who came from many foreign
countries as well as from every state in the Union.
More clearly than most lawyers engrossed in private practice, Mr.
Cook realized the implications and possibilities of the co-ordination of
the three great departments of the profession of the law,-teaching,
practicing and adjudicating. He rightly believed that the first function
of a law school is to train lawyers. But he also believed that in order to
develop leadership individuals who show marked aptitude in the law
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should have an available opportunity to develop more fully this special
talent, under circumstances where practical considerations would not
so ruthlessly reject or obscure the social implications involved as would
be the case in private practice.
In his practice the lawyer of necessity deals with controversies or
situations involving doubt, relating to transactions which are being
carried out to achieve definite ends. He therefore draws upon the law
for that which will aid him in attaining the end sought by his client.
He cannot weight the enterprise with considerations which in his
judgment or in the judgment of his client may result in the loss of the
objective sought. The judge, because he is required to decide contro
versies promptly, must deal very largely with the legal materials
furnished him by lawyers. While a judge may and often does have a
full appreciation of the social implications of the case before him, he is
obliged to proceed within strictly defined limits. It is well that this is
uue, for social projects advanced today with great confidence and vigor
are often rejected tomorrow because they do not work. The law can
with safety accept only those social concepts which have withstood
the test of experience. Moreover, time for consideration and reflection
on the part of the judge is limited. The pressure of modern business
creates a demand upon our courts for speedy decision which makes
impossible except in rare cases a philosophical rationalization of the law
of any particular case. The teacher on the other hand has a two-fold
function. He not only instructs but he systematizes and correlates the
material with which he deals. In doing this he criticizes not only the
work of the lawyer but the work of the judge. He has also unusual
opportunity for reflection, consideration and reconsideration. If he does
not complete his investigation this year he may do it next year. Clients
and parties are not knocking on his door demanding that he forthwith
announce his conclusions. He may properly range the fields covered by
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the other social sciences. He may consult and debate with others with
out fear of disclosing professional secrets, which were he a practicing
lawyer or a judge, might subject either a client or a party to the risk of
harm. He may submit his deductions to students who are keen, dis
criminating and not inhibited by considerations of consequences or a
fine sense of delicacy. While their judgment may not be tempered by
experience, their range is wide and their viewpoint unclouded and
varied. So over the years by a process of elimination and refinement the
teacher works over his material and develops a systematic and accurate state
ment of the law. It is not too much to say that the work of the law school
teachers in the last forty years has given direction to and an interpretation
of the development of our law which is of the very greatest importance.
If in some way the skill and experience of the practitioner, the wis
dom and poise of the judge, the scholarship, the ability to refine, and
the power to impart knowledge of the teacher, could be focused upon a
group of unusual, able and enthusiastic students, an important step
would be taken in the realization of Mr. Cook's ideal. The study of the
law

in

vacuo

is likely to be sterile and so far detached from realities in

the field of legislation and the administration of the law as to be almost
without practical value. The output of the law schools in the way of
articles and dissertations is in itself fragmentary and uncorrelated, and
as one ponders some of these products of the cloister he may well
wonder if they were not written to display the erudition of the writer
and with very little knowledge of the practical working of the law in
an every day world. One will make no reference to the work of the
destructive and belligerent young critics who imagine themselves to be
face to face with the beginning of a new era every time they look in the
mirror. They will never agree and like the Kilkenny cats will shortly
dispose of each other.
But there comes from the law schools a body of literature that is

Law Quadrangle

73

immensely worth while. Any practicing lawyer or judge who ignores it
makes a grave error whether he be most concerned with the interests of a
client or with the justice and soundness of

a

decision. The difficulty

with this material is that it is for the most part not available in usable
form for the lawyer, the judge or the legislator. It is detached and not
related to the present needs of the state nor is it immediately helpful to
the bar or to the courts. It has value but the same effort might produce
material of much greater usefulness. Much of it is speculative or so
highly controversial as to require restatement to reduce it to a usable
form. On the other hand that which deals with problems which are
before courts and legislatures for solution often presents dispassionately
and accurately the present state and trend of the law in a way that makes
it very valuable.
It is not too much to hope that here upon this Campus there may be
developed a method of co-ordinating the work of the teachers, the
lawyers and the judges in such form that it may be understandable and
usable not only by members of the bar but by legislators and those who
deal with the content of the other social sciences. It is quite probable
that Mr. Cook had something of this kind in mind. The endowment
created by him offers to the faculty of the Law School of the University
of Michigan a great opportunity for leadership as well as for the
development of leaders.
To be more specific, the work already done under the direction of
members of the faculty of the Law School of this University in pro
posing a revised code of procedure for the State of Michigan and in
making available for legislative committees elsewhere the result of
researches in the law of practice and procedure and the annotation of the
restatement of the law of contracts, illustrates in a very striking way the
possibilities of worthwhile achievement. Research which grows out of
and is connected with the living stem of the law is of much greater
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present value than if it be detached and floating so to speak in legal
space.
Mr. Cook's plans are being realized at a time which is most oppor
tune. He was undoubtedly a man of great foresight and must have had
a very keen appreciation of the fact that a great change in the law was
imminent; but we should be obliged to endow him with the attribute of
truly prophetic insight if we were to say that he foresaw anything like
the present shift in our legal order involving as it does not only the
application of constitutional principles to new situations but also the
relation of the states to the federal government and a redistribution of
the police power between them. The questions of law raised by the
proposals which have been put into operation during the last two
years and by those now being put forward are of the most fundamental
character. It is quite probable, judging by the past, that the extent of the
shift will not be so great as many now suppose; it will nevertheless be
significant. It is possible that what now currently passes for change is
nothing more than an appreciation by the public of the fact that many
changes have already been made, which have heretofore escaped notice.
The constitution of any state at best marks merely a beginning, -a
time when fundamental principles are declared and direction given to
the future development of law and government. The men who for
mulated the federal constitution well understood this fact. They recog
nized much more clearly than many of their successors the fact that law
and government are growing and constantly developing institutions and
are therefore subject to change and adaptation. Constitutional principles
are analogous to the range lights which guide the mariner. They mark
out a safe course but that does not mean that the first course laid out is
and must always remain the best course.
It is well within the truth to say that since the period of the civii war,
there has been a growing indifference to fundamental constitutional
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principles. Such interest as there has been was the result of definite
economic and social rather than purely political pressure. Because of
this widespread lack of interest many actual changes have escaped popu
lar notice. The great body of decision relating to the exercise of the
police power by the federal government affords an excellent illustration
of the situation. More than twenty years of experience at the bar and
nearly as many on the bench have emphasized to my mind the necessity
of re-establishing the validity and importance of constitutional prin
ciples in the mind of the general public.
Within the limited time available it would be impossible to sketch
even in barest outline the changes and adaptations of the constitution
other than by amendment which have taken place in the one hundred
and forty years since its adoption. Without attempting in any way to
discuss the merits or demerits of the doctrine, either in theory or prac
tice, we may briefly, by way of illustration, consider that body of
political and constitutional principles ordinarily associated under the
tide, "Separation of Powers. "
The general notion that a citizen could not adequately be protected
in the enjoyment of his liberties unless the legislative, executive and
judicial powers were exercised by different persons or groups of per
sons, seems to have originated with Aristotle. Its greatest expositor,
however, was Montesquieu. His treatise " The Spirit of Laws" became
current in the English-speaking world in the earlier decades of· the
eighteenth century and had a profound influence upon the political
thought of that day. It had a wide reading in the American colonies and
its influence upon our political thinking has persisted down to our own
time.
The English people including the colonists had been subjected in
turn to the tyranny of the executive, to unlawful exactions by the
legislative, and to usurpations by the judicial branch of the government.
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It was natural therefore that those who formulated the constitutions of
the original thirteen states and of the United States should have re
garded the separation of powers as of prime importance and in order
firmly to establish it, should have adopted the theory as a working
principle of constitutional law. In France and England the doctrine has
always remained a matter of political theory, where it has guided and
directed rather than controlled political action. But in the United
States, when in 1 78 7 the constitution was submitted to the people of
the States for their rejection or approval, the principal objection made
to it was that it did not declare in definite terms that the legislative,
executive and judicial departments ought to be separate and distinct. In
reply to this criticism, James Madison pointed out in The Federalist
that while no political truth was of greater intrinsic value or was
stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty than
that on which the objection was found, nevertheless neither in England
nor in the constitutions adopted by the colonies were these depart
ments totally separate and distinct from each other. He cited the
constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in which the
doctrine was expressed as follows:
"In the government of this Commonwealth the legislative depart
ment shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers or either of
them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial pow
ers or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the executive
and legislative powers or either of them; to the end it may be a gov
ernment of laws and not of men.''

He quoted from Jefferson's "Notes on the State of Virginia," as

follows:
"All the powers of Government, Legislative,Executive, and Judiciary,
result to the Legislative body. The concentrating of these in the same
hands is precisely the definition of despotic Government. It will be no
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alleviation, that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands,
and not by a single one. One hundred seventy-three despots would
surely be as oppressive as one. Let those who doubt it, turn their eyes
to the Republic of Venice. As little will it avail us, that they are chosen
by ourselves. An

elective despotism was not the Government we fought

for; but one which should not only be founded on free principles, but
in which the powers of Government should be so divided and balanced
among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend
their legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by
the others. For this reason, that Convention which passed the ordinance
of Government, laid its foundation on this basis, that the Legislative,
Executive, and Judiciary departments should be separate and distinct,
so that no person should exercise the powers of more than one of them
at the same time."
That the framers of the constitution as well as the people of the
several states considered the exercise of the separate powers by distinct
persons or groups as vitally necessary to the preservation of the rights
guaranteed by the constitution admits of no doubt. The doctrine was
indeed so generally accepted by the various departments of government
that it was scarcely drawn in question down to the time of the civil war.
John Marshall, the great expounder of the constitution, although he
was a member of the Supreme Court of the United States for more
than a third of a century, was never called upon to deal in concrete
form with this question. Even in the states controversies involving the
doctrine arose in rare instances and then only in connection with
matters which were relatively unimportant.
But experience demonstrated not only that the legislative branch of
the government could not deal effectively with all of the complex
factual situations which confronted it; it also further appeared that the
judicial branch of the government was not so organized as to deal with
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matters which were really more administrative than judicial; and we
began to move away step by step from our original position, although
at first the line of cleavage was barely perceptible.
The creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 may
be taken as well as any other date for the point of departure from the
accepted doctrine of the separation of powers. In the beginning the
Interstate Commerce Commission was little more than an extra
legislative committee charged with the duty of inquiring into and find
ing the facts with reference to certain aspects of the transportation
problem. It reported not to Congress but to the Secretary of the
Interior and its findings were communicated to Congress by the executive.
But in a short time it became clear that if the Interstate Commerce
Commission was to be an effective agency in the solution of the prob
lems presented to Congress, it must have powers much wider than
those which had at first been granted to it.
Fifty years ago in order to kill any legislative measure which by its
terms proposed to endow administrative agencies with rule-making or
fact-finding powers, it was sufficient to point out that the proposed
measure delegated legislative or judicial power and was therefore un
constitutional. The necessary first steps away from the accepted doctrine
were frowned upon by the courts and taken in the face of many diffi
culties and with many misgivings. Gradually, however, the pressure
became so great and the need of supplementing the legislative and
judicial branches of the government so apparent that finally the attempt
to evade or hurdle the constitutional barriers was successful.
How, if all governmental power was vested in the three great depart
ments of government, were the new administrative tribunals to be
given enough authority to make them effective? From what source
was the power to be drawn? The doctrine was all-inclusive-no govern
mental power was lying around unappropriated. Many ingenious de-
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vices were evolved by means of which it was hoped the constitutional
restraints might be avoided. Finally under the guise of conferring upon
administrative tribunals the power to find facts, grants of power which
passed the judicial test were made. Although the powers granted to
such tribunals were in fact equivalent to judicial power, the grant was
stated in terms which obscured the real nature of the power conferred.
To these same administrative tribunals was also delegated the power
to make so-called orders or rules principally in the form of safety codes,
building codes,health codes,electrical codes and other similar bodies of
rules, all of which have the force and effect of law. The power to
promulgate a rule for a violation of which a citizen may be punished
is in fact legislative power. There has thus in fact been a delegation of
judicial and legislative power to administrative tribunals with the
result that the same body which makes the law determines whether or
not the law has been broken and also imposes the penalty therefor. The
fact that these tribunals were in the beginning and to a large extent still
are manned by trained lawyers and adopt so far as is practical court
procedure, has up to the present time prevented most of the undesirable
consequences which Jefferson and his contemporaries feared would flow
from an exercise of judicial and legislative powers in combination. This
was quite generally true down to March, 1933. That it is still true can
not be alleged with so much confidence.
One important consideration in this connection, however, seems to
have escaped public notice. The fact is that judicial power when
exercised by an administrative tribunal escapes the restraints imposed
by the constitution upon the manner of its exercise. From the beginning
it has been held that all courts exercising judicial power must as re
gards fundamentals exercise it according to the course of the common
law so that no citizen may be deprived of his liberty or property except
by due process of law. It is true that due process was not defined in the
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constitution; but when a court was created by constitution or statute,
it was held to be a court as that institution including its procedure was
known to the common law. Many state constitutions in addition re
quired that the writ of error sho�ld never be abolished, thereby securing
to parties a right of review. But the procedure of the administrative
tribunal is not according to the course of the common law; it is ordi
narily prescribed by the tribunal itself. While in certain instances judicial
power is exercised by administrative tribunals in conformity to the
common law, in many other respects its procedure has necessarily been
of a summary character. A significant and growing tendency to abuse
appears in efforts which have been and are being made to prevent a
review of findings of fact made by administrative tribunals, even
though they may be clearly against the great weight of the evidence and
supported only by a scintilla of proof. In the great majority of cases the
rights of interested parties to a controversy are for all practical purposes
ultimately determined when the facts are found so that parties are
denied an effective right of review where findings of fact are made con
clusive upon the courts.
When an administrative tribunal in the exercise of its so-called rule
making power prescribes a rule of conduct for a citizen which rule may
be enforced in a court, it to all intents and purposes exercises legislative
power. When a law in the form of a rule is established by the order of
an administrative tribunal, the law-making power escapes all con
stitutional restraint as to the manner of its exercise. Practically every
constitution in this country provides for two branches of the legislature;
for the introduction and reading of bills which are then customarily
referred to committees, reported back and debated. After a bill has been
passed by one house it must be concurred in by the other house and
when concurred in must be submitted to the executive for his approval.
But the administrative tribunal may without a hearing, without sub-
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mitring proposals, without debate and of its own motion declare a rule
which has the force of law. Thus the law-making power not only escapes
constitutional restraint as to the manner of its exercise but it is exercised
by a group over which the electorate has only a remote if any control.
The exercise of the judicial and the legislative and the executive powers
in combination and their exercise by persons other than those chosen at
an election were the things most feared by Jefferson and his contem
poraries for the fundamental reason that it was believed to be destruc
tive of the actual democratic government which they were forming.
The abandonment of the doctrine of separation of powers and of its
corollary that a power once delegated may not be redelegated, has not
come about in response to a political movement or at the behest of a
vocal and persistent minority. It has been the result rather of steady,
irresistible, social pressure which has arisen from the fact that govern
ment in the last hundred years has been obliged to concern itself more
and more with regulations designed to equalize economic opportunities
and to bring under subjection the activities of the modern corporation.
The forces that have operated here in the United States have operated
along the same lines to a greater or less extent in all western countries.
While social pressure has not resulted in similar action in each country
some modification of previous political concepts has been necessary in
nearly all. For very obvious reasons the situation in England most
closely parallels that in this country. A brief statement of the situation
there throws a great deal of light upon the situation here.
As has already been said, in England the doctrine of the separation of
powers has remained a matter of political theory, though any de
parture from the doctrine in that country has met with more resistance
than in this country. The reason is not difficult to discover. Most Amer
icans apparently believe their constitutions when once established are
eternal and immutable unless modified in the manner prescribed in the
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instrument. The English people on the other hand are aware that their
constitution depends for its preservation upon the constant vigilance of
those who believe in its fundamental principles. Any departure there
fore from established constitutional principles in England attracts much
more popular attention than it does in the United States.
Lord Hewart, Lord Chief Justice of England, has dealt with the

subject in his book "The New Despotism. " He believes that by pro

curing the delegation of power to government departments a despotic
and arbitrary rule is being established in Engl�nd. While the book does
not lend itself very well to quotation, his position may be summarized
in his own language somewhat transposed, as follows: He says:
"What is meant by the 'rule of law' is the supremacy or the pre
dominance of law, as distinguished from mere arbitrariness, or from
some alternative mode, which is not law, of determining or disposing
of the rights of individuals. But the supremacy of law, as we know it,
means something more than the exclusion of arbitrary power, and
something more also than the equality of all citizens before the ordinary
law of the land administered by the ordinary courts. A little inquiry will
serve to show that there is now, and for some years past has been, a
persistent influence at work which, whatever the motives or the inten
tions that support it may be thought to be, undoubtedly has the effect
of placing a large and increasing field of departmental authority and
activity beyond the reach of the ordinary law. Much toil, and not a
little blood, have been spent in bringing slowly into being a polity
wherein the people make their laws, and independent judges administer
them. If that edifice is to be overthrown, let the overthrow be accom
plished openly. Never let it be said that liberty and justice, having �ith
difficulty been won, were suffered to be abstracted or impaired in a fit of
absence of mind. The exercise of arbitrary power is neither law nor
justice, administrative or at all. The very conception of 'law' is a con-

Dedicatory Exercises
ception of something involving the application of known rules and
principles and a regular course of procedure. There are no rules or
principles which can be said to be rules or principles of this astonishing
variety of administrative 'law', nor is there any regular course of
procedure for its application.''
Lord Hewart envisions a return not in form but in political effect
to the time of the Stuarts when the promulgation of law was a prerog
ative of the crown. Despite his very vehement denunciation of the
practice of delegation of the powers of parliament, Lord Hewart never
theless says:
"It is tolerably obvious that the system of delegation by Parliament
of powers of legislation is within certain limits necessary, at least as
regards matters of detail, because it is impossible, if only for want of
time, for Parliament to deal adequately and in detail with all the
matters calling, or supposed to call, for legislation. Indeed, without a
drastic alteration of its methods of procedure, it would be impossible
for Parliament to deal adequately with even a comparatively small part
of the present-day volume of departmental legislation. It may also be
conceded that the system, if not abused, and subject to proper safe
guards, may have its uses. It is the abuse of the system that calls for
criticisms, and perhaps the greatest abuse, and the one most likely to
lead to arbitrary and unreasonable legislation, is the ousting of the
jurisdiction of the Courts."
The case for those who support the practice of delegating legislative
power by parliament is stated by Mr. John Willis in his "Parliamentary
Powers of English Government Departments'' and may be very briefly
quoted in shortened form as follows:
"Much is now expected of the State; it is no longer enough for it to
keep the peace, it must watch over health, education, industry, trans
port, and many other social interests. With its vast resen·es of coerci\'e
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power and of wealth it can afford to disdain a short-sighted materialism,
and with its far-reaching tentacles it can fasten upon sources of informa
tion which would be denied to private business operating for private
gain. With the changing viewpoint of the State,-and it has so changed
because the m.ajority of voters so desired,-government naturally fell
into the hands of officials whose function it is to build rather than to

destroy. "

He continues: " One of the reasons for delegating power to make
rules to the departments is, put shortly, to enable questions of detail
to be removed from the consideration of Parliament. Right up to the
middle of the nineteenth century Parliament not only took care to
provide for every exceptional case within the purview of the Act, but
appended schedules of forms or tables of fees. . . . Now it was not from
choice that Parliament obscured the generality of its enactments by a
cloud of petty details; the Civil Service as we know it today had not
yet been born, and there were no departments upon which to rely. But
if a mass of cumbersome detail was not then a burden it would be a
burden today. . . . A glance at any volume of the Statutes will show
that there is now a genuine attempt to state the intention of Parliament
in plain language that shall be intelligible and unambiguous for lawyer
and layman alike. Further, even though it were practicable for Parliament
to give up its time to discussion of details, there is no guarantee that

it would be competent. "

There would be no justification for these extended quotations on this
occasion from the works of Lord Hewart and Mr. Willis were it not
for the fact that what is true of the development of administrative law
in England is equally true of its development in this country.
In both countries up to the present time criticism has been directed
principally at the re-delegation of power vested in constitutional bodies.
Little has as yet been said with respect to the consequences which may
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be expected to flow from the exercise of the several powers by one and
the same person or group.
Montesquieu said: "The political liberty of the subject is a tran
quillity of mind, arising from the opinion each person has of his safety.
In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be so con
tinued as one man need not be afraid of another.
"When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty;
because apprehension may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should
enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
" Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated
from the legislative and executive powers. Were it joined with the
legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to
arbitrary control; for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it
joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the
violence of an oppressor.
''There would be an end of everything, were the same man, or the
same body, whether of the nobles or of the people to exercise those
three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolu
tions, and that of judging the crimes or differences of individuals. "

Here in concise and precise language is epitomized the whole philos
ophy of the doctrine of separation of powers. In the beginning of our
constitutional history, it was thought that the people by the adoption
of the constitution had not only provided for a government of laws and
not of men, but that they had determined how the persons by whom the
prescribed powers would be exercised, should be chosen. If we consider
the importance of the matters dealt with by administrative agencies
today we shall discover that they dispose of matters of the highest im
portance whether measured by the value of the subject-matter involved
or by the effect of their determinations upon the social welfare of the
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state. We have but to observe the proceedings of the Interstate Com
merce Commission and of the Public Service Commissions of the
various states to realize that this is the case. The personnel of these
agencies is appointed and not elected, yet they discharge functions of
government much more important than those performed by many
elected officers.
The fact that there could never be and never was in practice a com
plete separation of the powers which fully accorded with political theory
accounts in part for the ready acceptance of the change by the people. By
the constitution certain judicial powers were reserved to the legislature,
for instance the power to determine the election and qualification of its
own members. Historically certain administrative powers were vested in
the courts, an example of which is the power to administer a trans
continental railway upon the theory that the administrator or the
receiver is an arm of the court. As a matter of practical necessity of
course every executive must in the first instance interpret and construe
legislative enactments in order that he may take the first steps toward
their enforcement. While this is not an exercise of a judicial power,
such interpretations especially when long acquiesced in are given great
weight in all branches of the government. The executive may also veto
acts of the legislature. He may in effect set aside the judgment of a
court by granting a pardon. No undesirable results were seen to flow
from the exercise of these powers by the persons in whom they were
vested. When the creation of administrative tribunals became necessary,
if the government was to perform its functions in a changing order, it
was but natural that in the interest of the public welfare the power
should be lodged where it might be most conveniently and effectively
exercised. The fears entertained by Montesquieu, Locke,Jefferson and
those who accepted their ideas that tyranny and oppression would
result from a combination of power, no longer existed in the public
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mind. A century of experience under a written constitution had caused
these fears to subside if not in fact to disappear. There was no longer an
immediate background of political oppression such as the colonists had
suffered. It is possible that the character of the men who exercise
political power has so changed that the exercise of these powers in
combination will now produce a different result from that produced in
times gone by. It is quite generally believed, however, that human
nature has not undergone a radical change in recent time. There are son1e
indications that there exists a tendency in public officials of the present
day as in public officials of two hundred years ago to act arbitrarily and
sometimes oppressively, always of course for the purpose of achieving a
worthy and desirable end. In this country we have had not only the crea
tion of administrative agencies by legislative enactment and the pro
mulgation of laws by executive proclamation but we have now a species
of law-making by agreement of the representatives of the group which
will be directly affected by the law when made.
Enough has been said to indicate that there has been a very wide
departure in practice from the political principles and concepts which
guided our early legislators in the matter of the delegation and redistri
bution of governmental power, and of the exercise of some of the
powers of the three great departments in combination. It may be
thought that too much has been said as to the merits of the question
but some discussion is necessary to establish the importance of the
doctrine under present day conditions. It does not appear that there has
been a careful analysis or appraisal of the extent of this departure, nor
what effect if any it has had upon the liberties and personal rights of
individuals. Admitting that it was necessary to abandon the laissez faire
idea that that government governs best which governs least, it does not
necessarily follow therefrom that the individual citizen no longer
needs the protection of a constitution in order to preserve and enjoy his
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liberty. A great public service might be rendered if the whole subject
were investigated in an impartial and scientific way. A good deal of the
writing that we have had has been done in order to establish and sustain
a specific thesis. One would have about as much difficulty in saying that
Mr. Willis was an impartial observer as he would have in saying that
Lord Hewart approached the whole question in a judicial manner.
I conceive it to be a part of Mr. Cook' s plan that the school of research
to be created upon this Campus should render just such a service to the
country. I see no reason why a scientific and scholarly study of the whole
subject may not be made although it must of necessity deal with a matter
that is somewhat controversial and is even now in a transitional stage.
The change, however, is not so rapid that it may not be observed and
its trend established.
I t is not my thought that such an investigation should be undertaken
for the purpose of enabling us to retrace our steps and so form the basis
of a regressive movement. My thought is rather that the investigation
and appraisal should be made in order that we may determine how far
we have proceeded, for what reason and with what effect. In dealing
with matters concerning human relations whether legal or social, we
are obliged to start from where we are. There does not appear to be, at
least on the part of the public or even on the part of the legal profession
as a whole, an awareness of the extent of the departure which has already
been made from the body of doctrine known as the separation of
powers. In order that we may be able to take the next necessary step
intelligently and in the right direction, we must first know where we
stand, otherwise we step in the dark. If it be assumed that the doctrine
had validity in the beginning; that it was evolved as a matter of ex
perience in government extending over millenniums; that i t was intended
to set limits to the universal tendency of human beings who have power
to endeavor to acquire more power; that an observance of the doctrine
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in principle at least is necessary to a preservation of individual liberty;
then it follows that such an investigation as is proposed would be of the
highest value. It may be that such an appraisal might not be accepted or
considered by the public at large. It would , however, be accepted and
considered by those in positions of leadership and this, I take it, was at
least a part of Mr. Cook's plan.
In practice written constitutions have one great defect so far as public
opinion is concerned. People at large regard

a

political principle em

bodied in a constitution as self-sustaining and self-enforcing and for the
most part so our constitutions were in the beginning. But we have
gradually grown away from the conditions which produced the con
stitution and the experiences which prompted us to write these political
principles into the constitution. As a people we forget that we once
suffered all abuses of governmental power set forth in the declaration of
independence and we therefore look with tolerance upon departures
from constitutional principles. We have no immediate experience which
emphasizes to the public mind the reasons for and the importance of a
particular principle although we may be about to acquire some such
experience. Thus a proposal at the present time to limit the right of
trial by jury or of free speech is not met in the same spirit with which it
would have been met a hundred years ago. While it is not fashionable
at the present moment to do so, it would be helpful if we would more
frequently recall the fact that what we have achieved in the way of
personal liberty and self government has cost not only "much toil and

not a little blood " but centuries of time. It may be as Mr. Cook said

in his letter to the Lawyers Club that there has been infused into our
population a large element of recent immigrants who have different
standards, that they are without appreciation of Anglo-Saxon institu
tions and the concept of law as it has been developed on American soil,
and that the influence of this group has resulted in a weakening of the
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ideals of individual liberty held by the Anglo-Saxons from the time of
King Alfred. If this observation be true it affords an additional reason
for a revival of an interest in the fundamental political concepts which
underlie our law. If the present generation is to preserve and maintain
these ideals they must as a whole know what they are and must appre
ciate their present practical political value. It is as true today as in the
days of Patrick Henry that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance.
Unless we are vigilant to preserve our liberties, we may find as did
Esau that we have parted with our birthright for a mess of pottage.

Address
By NEWTON D . BAKER
Of the Cleveland Bar1 Secretary of War1 1916-1921

D

EAN Bates, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen: I
doubt whether anybody outside of the immediate family felt
so keen a sense of personal loss in the death of Queen Vic

toria as I. For a long time prior to that event, I had been of the persua
sion that she and I were the last of the Victorians and when she died I
felt isolated and alone.
I am well aware of the fact that it is the common custom nowadays
to think of the Victorians and to judge that great queen with reference
to the particular style of hat which she affected, but as a matter of fact,
a great case can be made for the Victorian Era.
Surely no poetry written since Victoria's death can compare with
that written during her reign. I know no English prose written since
that time which is either nobler in content or more classically precise
in form than that of Matthew Arnold and Cardinal Newman, or more
rich in color and emotion than that of John Ruskin. The liberation of
philosophical thinking which took place in that era, largely through
Huxley's superb exposition of Darwin's theories and hypotheses, is as
bold a departure and as brilliant a performance as the world has had
since Newton elaborated his laws. In political theory and in the develop
ment of legal institutions, English history throughout Victoria's sixty
years is full of outstanding achievements. It took Charles Dickens to
paint the picture of the necrosis which had overtaken chancery pro
cedure, but the great lawyers of Victoria's time reformed the Chancery
94
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and other courts of England until English justice became, and has re
mained, the model of the modern world for integrity, learning, inde
pendence and the expeditious determination of human rights.
In a larger view it is also to be remembered that the Victorian Era
put an end to the inanities of the four Georges, and that during that
time, the genius of the English people made a world wide empire,
governed with a higher degree of wisdom and success than has been seen
since the Vandals and the Visigoths entered Rome. And their genius
has persevered until, in our own day, in a quiet and orderly fashion,
without revolution, indeed without apparent strain, we have seen the
great British Empire converted into a commonwealth of independent
democracies, each preserving for itself and for the aggregate of which
it is a member, most of the ideals, political and personal, upon which
the liberties of the Englishman have grown. It is the orderly progress of
this development which tonight I select for emphasis. At every stage it
has seemed to be the natural and normal expansion of existing ideas and
institutions, and during all of it there has been tremendous loyalty to
the great fundamental and underlying principles which the British have
nowhere summed up, but which in their aggregate go by the name of
the British Constitution. If there has been any tendency to depart from
these underlying assumptions, it is chiefly in the matter on which Judge
Rosenberry has so profoundly spoken tonight. Indeed, I had it in my
mind to discuss somewhat the separation of powers, but he has done it
with a degree of thoroughness which makes any addition from me on
that subject unnecessary. I tha'nk him for what he has done, both be
cause of my deep sympathy with his view and because it frees me to
take up something else which I equally want to say.
Judge Rosenberry has pointed out that when the Constitution was
written, the two books which were consulted most by members of the
Constitutional Convention and the great group of lawyers and politi-
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cians who surrounded it were Montesquieu and John Locke. Mon
tesquieu was a young Frenchman of noble parentage. As a youth, he
became a lawyer and a member of the Parliament of Bordeaux. He
appears to have taken little interest in the practice of law, but he
devoted his entire life to the study of legal institutions both as he saw
them in operation about him and as he could read of them in history.
He went to England and lived there three years, coming back to France
with the idea which always after remained the cornerstone of his
institutional philosophy-the necessity for separation of governmental
powers. Some critics have said that Montesquieu found in England
what was not there, that the English themselves had no such sense of
the value of the idea, but Montesquieu thought he found it and he gave
twenty years of continuous labor to it. Certainly the modern world re
gards his " Spirit of Laws" as the contribution of a new political idea,
and that idea became one of the foundation stones of American con
stitutional theory and democratic belief.
The Constitution of the United States was, of course, written and
started on its way years before the beginning of the Victorian Era in
England, but during that era great things took place in this country and
it does not stretch the historical perspective to regard the growth of
British institutions during the reign of Victoria as analogous to and
substantially contemporaneous with the development of our own con
stitutional theory. Certainly the non-revolutionary method of progress
was the same in both.
The effort of the American Colonies to establish their independence
was an indigenous democratic movement. In the pre-revolutionary
literature, one does not find any sense of solidarity among the American
Colonies or any desire to establish a new country. Each of the colonies
was restless t,mder some grievance or restraint which it desired to shake
off, and about the only common cause the colonies were able to make
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was against alien and overseas rule, rather than in favor of a new
American confederation on the basis of common interest. The people
and their colonial governments were separatist and independent. Their
local laws were frequently published in books entitled " Liberties and
Laws." Indeed, there seemed to be a competition among the colonies to
see which could state most alluringly the number of liberties and rights
retained or vindicated by the members of their respective common
wealths. The political philosophers of the country, consisting of the
lawyers, preachers, and the very extraordinary group of reading and
thinking farmers, had each their several theories as to how the demo
cratic spirit which surrounded them could be given institutional form.
Plans to create a government were proportionately as many and as
various as plans in recent years to end the depression. Out of this seeth
ing mass of suggestions, three principal theories emerged which can be
described best by association with three great colonial names.
John Adams needs a biographer. To most school boys he appears as a
bit of a fuss-budget, but he was in reality a very great man as well as a
very great patriot, and in spite of the futility of the Committee on
Correspondence, and the somewhat pathetic vanities of his presidency,
he believed in democracy. Adams thought, however, that an enduring
democracy could only be established by providing that the majority of
the people should be the beneficiaries and that a cultured few at the
top, filled with unselfish aims and noble ideas and having all the ad
vantages of education and tested character, should look after the affairs
of the people for them.
Alexander Hamilton, who came of different stock, probably did not
believe in a democracy of any kind. Indeed he was not much interested
in forms of government. His idea was that the country would and
should be governed by its commercial interests. He foresaw expanding
commerce and advancing industry, and believed that we should have
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institutions which would advance the prosperity of the whole country
by bringing the interests of business men into control in matters of
policy.
Thomas Jefferson, by the way, also needs a biographer. He alone
believed in a democracy in which all individuals participated in power
and participated in the decisions of governmental policy. There is no
more strange and variegated figure in our history. He had singular limi
tations and equally amazing grasp and prophetic instinct and faith. It is
said that he had in a drawer in his desk at Monticello the constitutions
of one hundred democracies established in times earlier than his own,
all of which had failed. There was not then in the world an existing
democracy, yet Jefferson dared believe that there could be a successful
democracy in this country in which everyone would be a participant in
political power. We heard this afternoon some quotations from Jeffer
son which showed, however, the limitations of his faith. He dreaded
the intervention of commercial and industrial interests. One of our
speakers this afternoon quoted him as describing America by saying,
"We are an agricultural people. There is little commerce and almost no
manufacturing among us, and I pray God it will be a long time before
there is much of either." He believed that a society of the simple sort
we then had could acquire enough general education and give enough
attention to public affairs to make democracy work as a form of govern
ment, but the distortion caused by active commercial interests and the
congested wage earning populations which he had seen in the industrial
cities of the Old World introduced elements of danger which were
beyond his faith.
No really deliberate choice was made among these different theories.
Washington's administration was primarily Hamiltonian. Jefferson's
administration was something less than Jeffersonian. The Constitution
itself, with its checks and balances and its Venetian method of presi-
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dential election responded rather more to the theory of Adams than to
either of the others.
In later periods emphasis has shifted sometimes in one direction and
sometimes in another, but through it all, and in the Victorian Era in
America, the Supreme Court of the United States, took the Constitu
tion founded on Montesquieu and Locke, based upon the evolution of
English institutions, and, in decision after decision, established great
landmarks of liberty and freedom until in the end we have come to re
gard this as a flexible democracy so far as form is concerned, but in
substance fixing certain rights and privileges which the humblest citizen
in the land may with confidence assert no matter how haughty or how
powerful the opposing powers may be.
You may recall that Gladstone, whom we delight to quote on the
American Constitution, said that the American Constitution was the
greatest document ever struck off at one time by the mind of man, but
at the same time, and in a part of the same sentence which we rarely hear
quoted, he said that the British was the greatest constitution that had
ever grown and evolved out of the experience of the people. Both
peoples really had the same idea. On our side of the water we deemed it
better to write it down, perhaps fancying we might then more safely
leave it to shift for itself, while the British have preferred to make
watchfulness an assurance against encroachment or unauthorized change.
The point I want to bring out is that in both countries the genius of
successful democracy has been to institutionalize the experience of the
race-rather to make trial and error the guide and teacher than pure
theory or emotional invention. Dr. Jacks, who was principal at Man
chester College at Oxford, once said that the value of the study of
history is that it keeps us from letting our buckets down into wells
which have long since gone dry. That is the negative statement of it.
The method of our growth is the demonstration of the fact that the
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experience of the race is in the long view wiser than the spontaneous
brilliance of any generation. It is in this light that both the Victorian
Era in England and the Constitutional Era in the United States seem to
plead for education as the preservative of our liberties-education which
will enable us to be quite certain that we are neither attempting un
remembered failures; nor, on the other hand, embarking upon fanciful
courses which do not rest for their promise on the nature and the
character of the people among whom they are to be applied.
When the World War was fought, we persuaded ourselves that it was
fought for the purpose of making the world safe for democracy. Some
people said it was fought to make democracy safe for the world. It does
not seem to me to matter much which view is taken. The fact is that
immediately the war was over, peoples everywhere with one accord
cast out kings, emperors and oligarchies and joyously applied them
selves to the creation of democratic forms of government. The air was
filled with new constitutions. Conventions and constitutional assem
blies met where only royal diets had met before, and constitutions
appeared where once only imperial prescripts had been permitted. Prac
tically all the countries in the western world announced themselves as
democracies ready for business,

elected their representatives,

and

expected the millennium.
In a pathetically short while, it began to appear that things were not
going so well. All the woes of a devastating war, all the tensions of new
international relations, all the pitfalls and perils of new-found emanci
pations began to assail them. One after another of these peoples have
presented this spectacle to the world, that after having embarked on a
democracy, they have sought out a Lenin, a Hitler, or a Mussolini and
have said to them, ''This is too complicated and difficult for us: you do
it." Now why have they done this? It seems to me that the answer is
clear. They have done it because they learned by bitter experience that
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though democracy is the best form of government in the world, it is
altogether the most difficult form to operate. These peoples came
suddenly to a realization that they had not been trained to operate a
democracy; that they did not have the patience; that they did not have
the knowledge; that they did not realize that successful democracy is a
growth and not a gift. They wanted some instantaneous Alladin's lamp
process to change from imperialism to democracy, only to find that
democracies do not come that way. So we find all the world over that
democracy as a form of government has come into dispraise. Mussolini,
and I have no reason to doubt his sincerity, has spoken in withering
contempt of it. The Russian and German experiments have discarded
the whole theory in favor of regimentation, control, and coercion. In
deed it can be fairly said that democracy today survives only in the
English speaking and certain Scandinavian countries where it has grown
as a practice, while it has failed in every country which has sought to
attempt the ready-made by imitating or aspiring to the success else
where achieved.
Now one or the other of two things is going to happen. Either democ
racy is going to regain its lost place in the affections of men, or it is
going to lose out universally; and it is for this reason that it seems to me
of tragic importance that we people of the United States and of England,
who have learned the process by which democracy is created and pre
served, shall persevere along the lines which experience has taught us is
the true law of institutional growth.
I said a moment ago that democracy is the hardest of all forms of
government to operate and it daily grows harder. The things which
government has to do nowadays, as Judge Rosenberry has just said,
are not so simple as they were in Jefferson's day. Science strides ahead
with seven league boots, and invention carries research into practical
application with increasing rapidity. Meantime, some of the atmos-
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phere of Jeffersonian democracy has become distinctly Hamiltonian.
Both our domestic and our world relations are changing and all these
things multiply the problems of government.
Jefferson's idea was that a democracy of his type was possible only
because it required an amount of popular education which was within
the reach. of everybody. As he grew older, his thought dwelt more and
more upon the University of Virginia and the institutions of higher
learning then being established in the country. Plainly he already saw the
need for more education than he had at one time assumed would be neces
sary if the verdict of the electorate was to be a safe reliance for liberty.
If Jefferson were alive now, he would believe this even more intensely.
It used to be, even in my lifetime, that when young men received college
diplomas they remained educated men, but now the increase of knowl
edge and the increased complication of affairs comes so fast that to stop
learning for a day is to begin to be an uneducated man, and we are com
ing more and more to see that continuous education, sometimes
called adult education, is the only salvation of democratic institutions,
and I think we are also quite clear now that there must be specialists
among us. Nobody who tries to know everything, knows much of
anything. A certain irreducible minimum of common education we can
have and I, myself, place that minimum much above mere literacy, but
there must be leadership and specialized training in selected groups and
humility enough in the rest of us to be willing to be led and informed
by those selected to be specialists in particular matters.
Having these views, it is natural that I should rejoice in Mr. Cook's
benevolence to this institution which is not merely training lawyers,
but producing scholarly research in the law. And I think history will
record some day that there was a providential inspiration about the
selection of this place for this great institution. This is the Middle
West or the Near East as you may see fit to call it. In the spirit of the
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Middle West that vital thing called "Americanism" has long found its
stoutest defenders. Frederick Turner's epoch making contribution to
the written history of America shows the influence of the frontier.
Without that pioneer spirit which moved west with Daniel Boone,
Kenton, and others, it may very well be that our country's history
would have presented a totally different picture and our country's unity
would have been impossible to maintain. I was not born in this Middle
West and so I do not praise my ancestors when I say that a detached
observer in Mars during the last hundred years would probably always
have put his finger upon the Middle West as the spot that most
thoroughly and truly exemplified America. Now again in the Middle
West is established what bids fair to be the greatest law institution in
the world. It is superbly equipped and has every incitement to scholarly
research. The place and the thing it does are a call to patriotism and
leadership, and in the future it will bring from all over the United
States the ripest and most thoughtful scholars we have to take up such
research as Judge Rosenberry called for tonight-research which trys to
find out what we are really seeking and what we have to pay to get it.
If I have seemed to you tonight to stress unduly individual liberty
and freedom, if I have appeared to you to be a rugged individualist, I
shall not be abashed at the phrase. It is as clear to me as it is to you that
as life becomes more complicated and congested, we must surrender
more and more of our individual rights for the common good, but I do
not want to surrender one jot or tittle of these rights without knowing
what I am to get in return for it and that it is worth the sacrifice. We
must know it, not gu�ss at it. We must not be willing to make these
surrenders because somebody speaks in a loud voice or arouses an emo
tional atmosphere. When the surrender is asked, those who ask it must
have knowledge upon which to base their request.
One of the most brilliant and most delightful of the young gentlemen
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in Washington was reported in a newspaper the other day as saying that
there are people in the United States who are unaccountably, even
fanatically, devoted to the Constitution. I was not vain enough to think
this was a personal reference, but I am very happy to be sure that there
is at least one such person in the United States.
I believe in the Constitution. No doubt some part of my belief is my
birthright, that controlling complex of emotions and traditions which
surround us from our cradle to our maturity, but by far the larger part
of the basis of my belief is what the Constitution has in fact done. It
has made for the world for the first time in history a great and success
ful democracy. It does not assume to be unchangeable like the laws of
the Medes and Persians. It provides how it is to be amended, and my
prayer is that we may not see it amended while we are assembling the
evidence. This was all that Mr. Cook had in his mind. He did not build
this school to crystallize, but to study. He hoped that it would minister
to the preservation of American institutions. That preservation will best
come from the knowledge which this, as a research institution, can dis
seminate to inspire us to the possibility of our growth in the future as
we have grown in the past and to dissuade us from the rash and heady
experiments which the experience of the race has shown to be illusions.
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